matter, even though general norms exist on bearing firearms and their use for legitimate defense or public order. 169 ii. Absolute necessity: it is necessary to verify whether other less harmful means exist to safeguard the life and integrity of the person or situation that it is sought to protect, according to the circumstances of the case. 170 The Court has indicated that it cannot be concluded that the requirement of “absolute necessity” to use force against a person has been met when such a person does not represent a direct danger, “even when the failure to use force results in the loss of the opportunity to capture them.” 171 The facts of this case could, in principle, fit the hypothesis of preventing escape and/or repelling attack. The Court considers that, consequently, the use of force could be justified in response to the possible direct threat to the agents or to third persons owing to the supposed confrontation, but it should have been used as the measure of last resort. iii. Proportionality: the level of force used must be in accordance with the level of resistance offered, 172 which implies establishing a balance between the situation that the agent is facing and his response, considering the potential harm that could be caused. Thus, agents must apply a standard of differentiated use of force, determining the level of cooperation, resistance, or aggressiveness of the person involved and, on this basis, use tactics of negotiation, control or use of force, as appropriate. 173 135. In order to avoid confusion and uncertainty, it is essential that law enforcement officials identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intention to use their weapons at all times 174 and, in particular, in situations that, owing to their nature, endanger the fundamental rights of the individual. 136. To determine the proportionality of the use of force, the severity of the situation that the agent faces must be assessed. To this end, among other circumstances, it is 169 Articles 282, 65 and 66 of the Criminal Code, in force at the time of the events, established: “Article 282. The persons referred to in articles 280 and 281 may only use their weapons in case of legitimate defense or defense of public order. If they use such weapons improperly, they shall be subject to the penalties imposed by articles 278 and 279, as applicable, in addition to the punishments corresponding to the offense in which they have incurred by the use of the said weapons”; “Article 65. The following shall not be penalized: 1. Anyone acting in compliance with a duty or in legitimate exercise of a right, authority, position or function, within the legal boundaries. […] 3. Anyone who acts in self-defense or to defend his rights, provided that this is in the following circumstances: 1. Unlawful attack by the individual who is finally the victim of the event. 2. Necessity of the means used in order to prevent or repel the unlawful attack. 3. Lack of sufficient provocation by the individual who claims to have acted in self-defense,” and “Article 66. Anyone who crosses the boundaries imposed by the law in the case of the first paragraph of the preceding article, or by the authority who gave the order in the case of the second paragraph of that article, and anyone who uses excessive force in self-defense, or in the means used to safe himself from grave and imminent danger, doing more than necessary, shall be penalized with the corresponding punishment, reduced by one-third to two-thirds. The pecuniary penalty shall be applied reduced by half.” 170 Cf. Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia), supra, paras. 67 to 68, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 85 ii). Cf. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra, Principle 4. 171 108. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 85.ii), and ECHR, Case of Kakoulli v. Turkey, supra, para. 172 Cf. Inter alia, Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166, para. 85, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 85.iii). Cf. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra, Principles No. 5 and 9. 173 Cf. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 85 iii), and Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra, Principles No. 2, 4, 5 and 9. 174 “In the circumstances provided for under principle 9, law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances of the incident.” Cf. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra, Principle 10. 35