necessary to consider: the level of intensity and danger of the threat; the attitude of the individual; the conditions of the surrounding area, and the means available to the agent to deal with the specific situation. In addition, this principle requires the law enforcement agent, at all times, to reduce to a minimum the harm or injuries caused to anyone, as well as to use the lowest level of force required to achieve the legitimate purpose sought. 137. In this case, despite the statements of six eyewitnesses indicating that they had not seen that Igmar Landaeta was armed, bullet trajectory analyses and fingerprint tests on his right hand gave positive results, so that, in the hypothesis that he had fired at the agents, according to the principle of proportionality, the measures used to repel the attack should have considered a differentiated use of force. Even in the hypothesis of an armed confrontation, the Court considers that, from the evidence assessed, both the shots fired by the State agents were extreme, in other words, high-risk; the first in the top part of the shoulder, which reveals an advantage in the position of the agents and supports the versions that Igmar Landaeta was running, and the second in the bridge of the nose, which killed him owing to severe cerebral contusion. 138. Thus, beyond the supposed “order to stop” and the shots in the air mentioned by the agents, who were not wearing badges to identify themselves, the State has not proved that the least harmful means were used to achieve the intended result, consisting in subduing Igmar Landaeta. 139. In addition, four statements 175 by neighbors (eyewitnesses) who lived in front and at both sides of the place where the body of Igmar Landaeta fell, included the same version that he had begged them not to kill him (“don’t kill me, don’t kill me”), and after they heard shots they saw him wounded by a bullet with blood on his face, and watched while the agents took him away in a white car (supra paras. 61 and 63). Regarding the second shot, expert witness Baraybar indicated that the characteristics of the injury to the face with “entry hole with a halo of bruising around it, correspond to an injury resulting from a firearm ‘from a distance’ 176 on the nasal septum as indicated in the examination report […] [i]t can be inferred that […] (the injury in part of the head) occurred when he was on the ground.” 177 In addition, the Court notes that the body of Igmar Landaeta was transported from the scene of the incident and deposited, lifeless, in the Outpatient Clinic (supra para. 64). Moreover, the Second Court and the first decision adopted by the Appellate Court mentioned that the “second shot should not have been necessary” 178 and that there was “a disproportion between the harm caused by the agent and [Igmar Landaeta’s] intention of committing an unlawful act.” 179 140. In addition, the Court notes certain inconsistencies in the statements of the two witnesses who supported the version of the agents. The statements reveal that one of the witnesses (July Esther Zacarías de Villanueva) was the sister of police agent CJZM, 175 Cf. Testimony of witnesses Adeisa de la Trinidad Moffi Garcia, Vicmar Loydinet Colmenares Acosta, Francisca Acosta Jaspe and Jesús Chávez Cristin (annexes to the answering brief, folios 9135; 9141, 9142 and 9300; 9128 and 9296; and 9336, respectively). 176 Expert witness José Pablo Baraybar indicated that “Then we have to ask ourselves whether a person lying on the ground, as is the case of [Igmar Landaeta] that has already been established, could have received a shot ‘from a distance’ in the face from someone who was at a higher level; for example, either standing beside or above him. The answer is clearly positive, because the average measurement between the barrel of a pistol held by an adult with his arm extended is more than 50 cm.” Cf. Testimony of expert witness José Pablo Baraybar of January 29, 2014 (merits file, folio 834). 177 843). Testimony of expert witness José Pablo Baraybar of January 29, 2014 (merits file, folios 832 to 833 and 178 Cf. First instance judgment of the Second Court of the Transitory Procedural Regime, Judicial District of the state of Aragua of October 13, 2000 (annexes to the answering brief, folio 9605). 179 Cf. Judgment of the Appellate Court of April 25, 2002 (annexes to the answering brief, folio 9673). 36