that judgment and to order that a new oral trial be held, owing to the failure to take into account evidentiary material that had been provided opportunely (supra para. 116). In this regard, during the hearing before this Court, prosecutor Yelitza Acacio stressed, in relation to the actions of the first instance judge: “that his participation was biased; that his participation was partial, in collusion, trying to favor the defense and the accused, [the judge] would not give the prosecutor the opportunity to submit those elements of evidence […]. That is why he was recused, that is why he was denounced; this is what the disciplinary court of the Supreme Court of Justice is for.” “[There was] collusion – let’s call it by the name it merits – with the other party; in other words with the accused and with the defense, [so that the judge] insisted in concluding the deliberations.” 263. The Court also takes note that, on December 16, 2011, the day the first instance judgment was delivered with the acquittal, Ignacio Landaeta Muñoz filed a recusal against the same judge that prosecutor Yelitza Acacio, during her testimony at the hearing, indicated had been disqualified because he failed to examine evidence provided by the prosecutor and the presumed “collusion […] between the judge and the accused” 356 CARM. The latter worked with the security agencies in the judicial circuit, with access to all the facilities and personnel of the judicial circuit. 264. Based on the above, the Court considers that, although different procedures were carried out at the onset of the investigations, some of them were flawed. In this regard, the supplementary or expanded procedures were implemented between 8 and 12 years after the events, thus impairing the immediacy of the evidence and the possibility of obtaining reliable information, which resulted in the loss of evidence or the impossibility of collecting it, owing to the passage of time. The Court has verified the failure to take into account substantial evidence that could have helped clarify the events, despite requests by Ignacio Landaeta Muñoz and the prosecutor (supra para. 259). Similarly, the Court considers that the lack of procedures to disprove the version of the vehicle being intercepted by hooded individuals, as well as the absence of a joint investigation taking into account the events surrounding the death of Igmar Landaeta, and a series of irregularities in the proceedings, reveal a lack of effectiveness in the actions taken by the State in order to discover the truth and punish those responsible. B.3.3.2 Reasonable time 265. The Court emphasizes that the State of Venezuela has acknowledged the existence of judicial delay in the case of Eduardo Landaeta, justifying the delays by the entry into force of the Transitory Procedural Regime in Venezuela (supra para. 213). However, in this case, the Court notes that more than 17 years have passed since the events of the case and the start of the investigation, and a first instance judgment has still not been delivered. Furthermore, neither the facts of the case nor the truth about what happened have not been established, which has impaired the right of access to justice within a reasonable time of the members of Eduardo Landaeta’s family. Indeed, the Court notes the existence of serious procedural delays at the start of the criminal proceedings, owing to initial delays that can be attributed to the Ninth Prosecutor 357 and due to the issue of 356 Cf. Recusal request by Ignacio Landaeta Muñoz of December 16, 2011 (annexes to the answering brief, folios 8921 and 8922). 357 The Court has noted the existence of delays by the Ninth Prosecutor, because, although, on August 27, 1997, the Justice and Peace Human Rights Committee of the State Aragua presented a request for a “preliminary inquiry into unlawful conduct by a State agent,” it was not until March 25, 1998, when this request was responded to by the Court of the Santiago Mariño and Libertador Municipalities, and it was commenced on May 14 that year (supra para. 103). That court received the case file from the Mariño Division on August 13, 1998, when the summary procedures had been concluded, and it was not until February 8, 1999, that the Ninth Prosecutor formally accused the police agents of the offense of aggravated homicide and 75