11. Hence, we consider that, in this case, when declaring the violation of the principle of legality and the guarantee of the presumption of innocence, the Court ruled on aspects that differed from those that substantiated the alleged lack of judicial impartiality, because it is alleged that the latter occurred owing to the supposed exteriorization of prejudices in relation to the so-called “Mapuche conflict” that prevailed in the criminal judgments against the victims. Thus, it can be seen that the alleged causes of the lack of impartiality do not refer to the existence of the legal presumption or to its application in the guilty verdicts, but rather to the exteriorization of negative ethnic prejudices and with regard to the so-called “Mapuche conflict” to found the decision in the guilty verdicts. 2. The right to an impartial judge or court in international case law 12. The importance, in a democratic society, of the judges inspiring confidence should be emphasized and, particularly, that in the case of criminal proceedings they inspire the confidence of the accused.6 Accordingly, in this case, it is necessary to analyze the questions raised about whether the criminal proceedings in which the victims were convicted violated the right to be tried by an impartial court, a fundamental guarantee of due process of law protected in Article 8(1) of the American Convention, which stipulates that: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.” 13. Based on the contents of this provision, the Court has determined that the right to a competent, independent, and impartial judge or court has several different facets. When the State has been obliged to protect the judiciary as a system, there is a tendency to guarantee its external independence. When it is obliged to provide protection to the person of a specific judge, there is a tendency to guarantee its internal independence. 14. Thus, independence and impartiality not only result in a right in favor of the individual who is being tried, but also as a guarantee for the judges; in other words, to ensure that they have the institutional and personal conditions to ensure compliance with this mandate. Thus, in its case law, the Inter-American Court has analyzed the issue of judicial independence and impartiality from both the institutional and the personal perspective. 15. With regard to the institutional facet, the Court has indicated that, in order to achieve the independence and impartiality of judges, it is essential that they have institutional guarantees. These guarantees include tenure in office, a secure remuneration, and the method and form of appointment to, and termination of, their functions.7 Likewise, it should be pointed out that judicial independence is inherent in the principle of the separation of powers established in Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Thus the separation and independence of the public powers is a fundamental element of the rule of law. 6 Among others, ECHR, Case of Gregory v. The United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits), Court (Chamber), Judgment of 25 February 1997, Application No. 22299/93, para. 43; and Case of Sander v. The United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits), Court (Third Section), Application No. 34129/96, Judgment of 9 May 2000, para. 23. 7 Ernst, Carlos, “Independencia judicial y democracia”, in Jorge Malem, Jesús Orozco and Rodolfo Vázquez (comps.), La función judicial. Ética y democracia, Barcelona, Gedisa, 2003, p. 236. 4