215. This circumstance has two main consequences: (a) States must apply the content of this Convention even though they have not ratified it, and (b) regarding its temporal sphere, it should be applied even to crimes committed before its entry into force, because what would be applied would not be the treaty-based norm of itself, but rather a pre-existing customary norm. 158 216. In this regard, the Court agrees with the study of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the question of the non-applicability of statutory limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity, to the effect that the non-applicability results from the exceptional gravity of such conducts and their difference from crimes against domestic law results in the need for effective punishment of such crimes in accordance with international law; that the universal conscience which revolts against such crimes going unpunished, and because failure to punish them would arouse violent reactions on a very large scale. 159 217. The foregoing interpretation is consequent with contemporary rulings of the International Law Commission of the United Nations, a body tasked with developing and codifying international law, which, in 1996, adopted the Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. 160 humanity. August 12, 2009, General Riveros et al. in the case of Floreal Edgardo Avellaneda et al., considerandum I. Similarly, Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay: Cassation appeal, August 12, 2015. Case file 97-78/2012, Ruling 1.061/2015, consideranda III.1.b; Cassation appeal, August 24, 2016. Case file 170-298/2011, Ruling 1.280/2016, consideranda III.1 and III.2; Cassation appeal, September 8, 2016. Case file 395-136/2012, Fuling 1.383/2016, consideranda III.2 and III.3. In addition, see: expert opinion of Juan Ernesto Méndez, paras. 34 to 48 (evidence file, folios 14072 to 14077). Cf. UN. Commission on Human Rights. Study submitted by the Secretary-General on the question of the nonapplicability of statutory limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity. E/CN.4/906. February 15, 1966, paras. 157 160. Available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/906. 158 159 Cf. UN. Commission on Human Rights. Study submitted by the Secretary-General on the question of the nonapplicability of statutory limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity. E/CN.4/906. February 15, 1966, para. 159: “[…] 159. Thus, the principle that there is no period of limitation does not derive only from the intention of the international "legislator", who has clearly and urgently stressed the need for the sure and effective punishment of serious crimes under international law; it does not derive only from the universal conscience, which revolts against the idea that such crimes can go unpunished; it does not derive only from the state of positive municipal law, which has often hesitated, or even refused, to recognize the institution of statutory limitation in the case of serious crimes; it derives also, and above all, from the fact that none of the reasons usually advanced in favour of statutory limitation for crimes under ordinary municipal law justifies such limitation for the international crimes in question. The latter crimes cannot, from either the legal or the moral standpoint, be placed on the same footing as the former. If a crime under municipal law, however serious, goes unpunished through the operation of the statute of limitations, the fact does not usually make itself felt even in the narrow social environment, in which the crime was committed; the criminal, lawfully released for one or another of the reasons underlying the statute of limitations (remorse, forgiveness, loss of validity of proofs, etc.) quietly resumes his place in society and lives at peace with it. In contrast, impunity for a crime against peace or against humanity or for a serious war crime, whether acquired through statutory limitation or through any other means, arouses violent reactions on a very large scale; consequently, the result might be to expose the guilty party, now immune from any legal prosecution, to the "private justice" of the victims or of those bound to them by ties of blood, land, race, religion and so on. Because of the "exceptional" gravity, the "gigantic" magnitude and, above all, the "incomprehensible” motives of such international crimes, all these people, whose numbers can be readily imagined in each case, tend to be "unable ever to forget" and to be undeterred by any obstacle, legal or otherwise, from ensuring that, once the guilty are "unmasked", they are punished as they deserve. There is, therefore, every reason to consider whether the principle that there is no period of limitation for such crimes is not a rule of jus cogens, a peremptory rule, a fundamental rule of the international public order from which States can make no departure even by treaty.” 160 Cf. UN. International Law Commission. Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. A/CN.4/L.532. July 8, 1996. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.4/L.532. In particular, the draft code established that: “[…] Crimes against the peace and security of mankind are crimes under international law and punishable as such, whether or not they are punishable under national law” (Article 1.2); “[��] each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set out in articles 17, 18, 19 and 20, irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were committed. Jurisdiction over the crime set out in article 15 shall rest with an international criminal court. However, a State Party is not precluded from trying its nationals 46