7 paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention was not violated in the case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute”. 19. Both in the application it filed with the Court (May 20, 2002) and in its brief of final pleadings (July 5, 2004), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights maintained that in the instant case, the "convicted and accused inmates were never separated” at the "Panchito López" Center and "the accused were treated as if they had been convicted of a crime,” which implied a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence protected under Article 8(2) of the American Convention.16 The Commission added that the vast majority of the inmates were without legal representation and “almost the entire inmate population” was in preventive detention.17 And, as the Commission pointed out in its application, “[e]ven the State acknowledged this fact in the reports it filed with the Commission.” 18 20. In my opinion, the points made by the Inter-American Commission in this regard, both in its application and in its brief of final pleadings (supra) –points that the State did not contest either in its briefs19 or at the public hearing held by the Court- were proven beyond any reasonable doubt. There was a clear violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, to the detriment of almost all the inmates at the "Panchito López" Center. To expect or demand additional information from the petitioners20 is, as I see it, to saddle the victims with too heavy a burden of proof. In circumstances such as those established in the instant case (children deprived of their liberty and living under the constant threat of danger), as the representatives of the victims and of their next of kin (Ms. Viviana Krsticevic and Ms. María Clara Galvis) pointed out in the public hearing held by the Court (May 3-5, 2004), the burden of proof is reversed and must be borne by the respondent. 21. At that public hearing, the State’s representation denied the existence of a (deliberate) pattern of violations and insisted that the principle onus probandi incumbit actori must apply; at the same time, however, he reiterated –in very unambiguous language and with dignity- his acknowledgement of the problems in the prison system and his concern for the situation of the adolescents at the "Panchito López" Center. At no time did the State’s representation obstruct the proceedings before the Court. To the contrary, at the public hearing in question he again acknowledged the facts in the complaint, which included “the high percentage of inmates awaiting or standing trial but not yet convicted.” His posture was very helpful in establishing the facts in the cas d'espèce.21 16 Docs. cits., paragraph 118 and p. 28, respectively. 17 Docs. cits., paragraph 119 and p. 28, respectively. 18 Doc. cit., paragraph 119. 19 In its brief answering the application (December 13, 2002), the State was very clear in pointing out that “the lack of means also makes it difficult to correct another problem, which is the segregation of those awaiting or standing trial from those already convicted. The State is making efforts to comply with this provision of the Constitution and the law and is already seeing results in some detention centers." (paragraph 201). 20 21 As indicated at paragraphs 216-218 of the present Judgment. Moreover, in the present Judgment the Court has recognized the work that the State is doing through its legislative, administrative and other reforms that are particularly helpful in protecting children deprived of their liberty, given the State’s obligations under Article 19 of the American Convention (cf.