8 22. In the present judgment, the Inter-American Court itself accepts as proven fact that “the vast majority” of the inmates at the Panchito López Center were “awaiting or standing trial, but had not yet been convicted” and that those awaiting or standing trial “were not separated from the inmates who had been convicted” (paragraphs 134.19 and 20). It was up to the Court, then, to extrapolate the consequences of its own finding on the facts. That being the case, I fail to understand why a violation of both Article 8(1) and Article 8(2)(c) and (e) was not found. The finding that, in my view, the Court should have arrived at in the section on the merits, should have carried over into the section on reparations where, for reparations purposes, a distinction should have been made between the accused and those already convicted. In the instant case, there seems to be no doubt at all that the principle of the presumption of innocence protected under Article 8(2) of the Convention has been violated. 23. The broad scope of due process of law, as I perceive it, where Article 8(1) and (2) tie in with articles 25(1) and 7(6) of the American Convention, is in large part the result of the fundamental role and added importance that I attribute to general principles of law (cf. supra). My preference would have been to have this Judgment of the Court deal with judicial guarantees and judicial protection (articles 8 and 25 of the Convention) jointly –not separately, as was done. Both in its application and its brief of final pleadings, the Inter-American Commission made a very good case for this approach. 24. In exercising its contentious jurisdiction, the Inter-American Court has in fact linked articles 8 and 25 time and time again. It did so in its judgments in the cases of the “Street Children” (1999, paragraphs 219-228 and 235-237), Durand and Ugarte vs. Peru (2000, paragraphs 128-130), Bámaca Velásquez vs. Guatemala (2000, paragraphs 187-191), the Constitutional Court (pertaining to Peru, 2001, paragraphs 68-71 and 89-90), Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panama (2001, paragraphs 124-129 and 137), Las Palmeras (concerning Colombia, 2001, paragraphs 58-60), Maritza Urrutia vs. Guatemala (2003, paragraphs 116-121), Juan Humberto Sánchez vs. Honduras (2003, paragraphs 120-121 and 124), and the 19 Merchants vs. Colombia (2004, paragraphs 187 and 192-194). 25. Thus, the approach that I am advocating here, which links judicial guarantees and judicial protection (articles 8 and 25 of the Convention), is entirely consistent with the jurisprudence constante of the Inter-American Court both in contentious and advisory matters (cf. supra), and also affords a heightened degree of protection to those who need it. The abundant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights has recognized that the provisions of that article are true general principles of law, specifically that every person has the right to bring his case to an impartial and competent authority (which by extension means that justice cannot be denied) and to the principle of presumption of innocence. 26. All this points up the prominent role reserved for due process of law in the rule of law (État de Droit) in a democratic society. Hence, a narrow interpretation of due process would never be justified. The Inter-American Court has always accorded broad scope to Article 8 of the American Convention. This was particularly true, for paragraphs 214 and 263-265).