21 suspicion on which an arrest must be based forms an essential part of the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention which is laid down in Article 5(1) [of the European Convention,” adding that “having a ‘reasonable suspicion’ presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence.” 54 103. This Court finds that the suspicion must be based on specific facts, expressed in words; that is, not on mere conjectures or abstract intuitions. Consequently, the State should not detain someone to investigate him; to the contrary, it is only authorized to deprive a person of liberty when it has sufficient information to be able to commit him to trial. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, the deprivation of liberty of the accused cannot be based on general preventive or special preventive purposes, which could be attributed to the punishment, but, as stated above (supra para. 93), can only be based on a legitimate purpose, which is: to ensure that the accused does not prevent the proceedings from being conducted or elude the system of justice.55 104. Article 170 of the Ecuadorean Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the time of the facts only allowed the judge to order precautionary measures “[i]n order to guarantee the presence of the accused in the proceedings,” while Article 177 established that, “when he considered it necessary,” the judge could issue an order for remand in custody “provided the following procedural information existed: (a) evidence leading to the presumption of the existence of an offense that merited the penalty of deprivation of liberty, and (b) evidence leading to the presumption that the accused was the author of, or an accomplice to, the offense that was the object of the proceedings.” In addition, this Article required that “[t]he judicial order shall describe the evidence on which the order of imprisonment is based.” 105. The court order that required the remand in custody of the victims (supra para. 100) did not include a description, however brief, of the circumstances as regards the time, means and place in which Mr. Lapo supposedly committed the criminal offense, or any indication of the act or omission attributed to him, specifying the elements on which the accusation was based. In Mr. Chaparro’s case, the judicial authority did not provide grounds for why she believed preventive detention was essential “to guarantee the presence” of the accused or to allow the proceedings to be conducted. Furthermore, she did not indicate the offense committed by the two victims. Consequently, the order for remand in custody issued against Messrs. Chaparro and Lapo was arbitrary. 106. Even though the foregoing is sufficient to declare the violation of Article 7(3) of the Convention, the Court considers it important to refer to the Commission’s allegation that, during the criminal proceedings filed against the victims, the grounds for the measure depriving them of their liberty were never reviewed. The State did not present specific arguments on this point. 107. The Court emphasizes that it is the national authorities who are responsible for assessing the pertinence of maintaining the precautionary measures they issue pursuant to their own laws. When carrying out this task, the national authorities should provide 54 Cf. ECHR, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 30 August 1990, para. 32. The "reasonableness" of the suspicion on which an arrest must be based forms an essential part of the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention which is laid down in Article 5 (1) (c) (art. 51-c). The Court agrees with the Commission and the Government that having a "reasonable suspicion" presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as "reasonable" will however depend upon all the circumstances. 55 Cf. Case of Servellón García et al., supra note 17, para. 90, and Case of Acosta Calderón, supra note 47, para. 111.