16 effective recourse, in the European case-law in evolution, makes up the rule of law, which can not be dissociated from the rule of law in a democratic society.34 Its material content, as a subjective and autonomous right, characterizes it as "un outil fondamental de la mise-en-oeuvre de la protection des droits de l'homme."35 49. Luckily the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court has ignored these vicissitudes of the case-law of its European counterpart, whose current position on the matter in question is, as has been seen, similar to that of the Inter-American Court. Trying to dissociate Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention would also be, for this reason, in my opinion inadmissible and would be a setback to the prehistory of our Court’s case-law. It is regretful that, instead of continuing in the avant garde jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court in this sense, I find myself in the obligation to, in the heart of the Court, continue fighting to avoid a serious jurisprudential setback. VIII. The Right to Access Justice Lato Sensu. 50. In a Discussion held in 1996 by the University of Strasburg and the Cour de Cassation on "Les nouveaux développements du procès équitable" in the sense of the European Convention on Human Rights, J.-F. Flauss correctly pointed out the intimate relationship between the access to a tribunal (through an effective recourse) and the procès équitable, and added that the right to judicial benefits even covers the faithful execution of the Judgment in favor of the victim. 36 On this specific matter, the Discussion concluded acknowledging expressly "l'intimité profonde" between the access to justice (through an effective, simple, and prompt recourse) and the right to a procès équitable (the guarantees of the due process of law), in the framework of the rule of law in a democratic society.37 51. In the Reports I presented, as President at that time of the Inter-American Court, to the competent organizations of the Organization of American States (OAS), e.g., the days 04.19.2002 and 10.16.2002, I maintained my understanding in reference to the ample scope of the right to access justice at an international level, of the right to access justice lato sensu.38 Said right is not reduced to a formal access, p. 280. – From the beginning, the European Court has rejected a restrictive interpretation of Article 6 of the European Convention, given its “central” and “prominent” position in the same, and since it is related to the main general principles of law, among which “the fundamental principle of the rule of law"; A. Grotrian, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights - The Right to a Fair Trial, Strasbourg, C.E., 1994, p. 6. 34 D.J. Harris, M. O'Boyle y C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, London, Butterworths, 1995, p. 461. 35 A. Drzemczewski y C. Giakoumopoulos, "Article 13", in La Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme - Commentaire article par article (eds. L.-E. Pettiti, E. Decaux y P.-H. Imbert), Paris, Economica, 1995, pp. 474. 36 J.-F. Flauss, "Les nouvelles frontières du procès équitable", in Les nouveaux développements du procès équitable au sens de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme (Actes du Colloque du 22 mars 1996), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1996, pp. 88-89. 37 G. Cohen-Jonathan, "Conclusions générales des nouveaux développements du procès équitable au sens de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme", in ibid., p. 172. 38 Cf. also A.A. Cançado Trindade, "El Derecho de Acceso a la Justicia Internacional y las Condiciones para Su Realización en el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos", 37 Magazine of