4 even greater, in a continent like ours (including the three Americas), marked by cases that do not rarely deprive individuals of the protection of the Law. III. The Right to an Effective Recourse in the Jurisprudential Construction of the Inter-American Court. 11. Almost a decade ago, in my Dissenting Opinion in the case of Genie Lacayo versus Nicaragua (Request for Revision of the Judgment, Decision of 09.13.1997), 7 I proceeded to analyze the material content and scope of Article 25 (right to an effective recourse) of the American Convention on Human rights, in relation to Article 8(1) (due process of law) of the Convention, as well as with the general duties (to guarantee the exercise of the protected rights and of harmonization of the domestic law with the international conventional law) enshrined, respectively, in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention (paras. 18-23 of the mentioned Opinion). Contrary to that established by the Court in that case, - which considered these stipulations under the optics of formal and not material justice, - I concluded that a violation had occurred, by the respondent Government, of Articles 25, 8(1), 1(1), and 2 of the Convention “taken as a whole " (para. 28). 12. In the same line of reasoning, also in my previous Dissenting Opinion in the case of Caballero Delgado and Santana versus Colombia (reparations, Judgment of 01.29.1997),8 I developed an integrating hermeneutics of Articles 8, 25, 1(1), and 2 of the American Convention, once again considering them as a whole (paras. 2-4 and 7-9 of the mentioned Opinion), and stating, contrary to the Court, the violation by the respondent government of these four conventional provisions related inter se. Regarding the right to an effective recourse under Article 25 of the Convention, specifically, I made, in my previously mentioned Dissenting Opinion in the case of Genie Lacayo versus Nicaragua, the following statement: “The right to a simple, prompt and effective remedy before the competent national judges or tribunals, enshrined in Article 25 of the Convention, is a fundamental judicial guarantee far more important than one may prima facie assume,9 and which can never be minimized. It constitutes, ultimately, one of the basic pillars not only of the American Convention, but of the rule of law itself in a democratic society (in the sense of the Convention). Its correct application has the sense of improving the administration of justice at national level, with the legislative changes necessary to the attainment of that purpose. The origin - little-known - of that judicial guarantee is Latin American: from its insertion originally in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (of April 7 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH), Series C, n. 45, Request of Revision of the Judgment of 01.29.1997, Ruling of 09.13.1997, pp. 3-25. 8 9 CIDH, Judgment of 01.29.1997 (reparations), Series C, n. 31, pp. 3-43. Its importance was mentioned, for example, in the Informe de la Comisión de Juristas de la OEA para Nicaragua, of 02.04.1994, pp. 100 and 106-107, paras. 143 and 160, published six years later; cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, E. Ferrero Costa, and A. Gómez-Robledo, "Gobernabilidad Democrática y Consolidación Institucional: El Control Internacional y Constitucional de los Interna Corporis - Informe de la Comisión de Juristas de la OEA para Nicaragua (02.04.1994)", 67 Boletín de la Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (2000) n. 137, pp. 603-669.