36. In addition, the Court observes that, in its final written arguments, the State argued “the evident estoppel” incurred by the Commission and the representatives by proposing the testimony of witness Jesús Ollarves during the public hearing. According to the State, “estoppel” was constituted because the Commission argued “that the provisional and permanent judges should enjoy the same stability in their posts,” while witness Ollarves, proposed by the representatives, indicated that “this is not so.” On this point, the Court finds that the estoppel principle is not applicable in relation to the State’s argument27 and that, in any case, its observation refers to the scope of testimonial evidence that, as has been established, the Court will duly assess based on the indicated criteria (supra para. 33). 37. Lastly, in its final arguments, the State indicated that, based on “[t]he transparency that the Court must maintain with regard to the administration of the probative burden, […] particular care must be taken to establish whether all the judges responsible for deciding a case are fully competent to perform this fundamental jurisdictional task.” In particular, the State indicated the alleged “lack of competence that would arise as regards the [President of the Court] Diego García-Sayán if, [in] the final judgment in this case, […] some of the evidence requested, provided and weighed in the Apitz Barbera [case …] is assessed, particularly with regard to the expert opinions presented by Param Cumaraswamy, Jesús María Casal Hernández and Román Duque Corredor, […] because this judge recused himself from hearing that case; consequently, if the Court assesses this evidence […], it would be committing a serious error.” 38. The Court finds that the State’s observations on the possible use of these expert opinions (supra para. 8) are not based on facts that affect the impartiality of the President of the Court. Furthermore, the State’s arguments are not related to the arguments set out by the President of the Court when recusing himself in the case of Apitz Barbera et al. Consequently, the Court rejects the State’s observation. Nevertheless, the Court will not use these three expert opinions in this case, considering that the available body of evidence provides sufficient elements for deciding the merits of this case. VI PRIOR CONSIDERATIONS ON FACTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE APPLICATION 39. According to the representatives, “although it is not possible to learn the explicit content of the opinions […] that were grounds [for the decision of] the judges from [either] the record of the removal of Judge Chocrón or the minutes of the meeting of the Judicial Commission,” the facts of the case reveal a direct connection with the inspection carried out by the alleged victim in favor of Division General (National Guard) Carlos Rafael Alfonso Martínez.” The representatives indicated that the General was “arrested on a military base, accused of alleged 27 On this point, the Court recalls that, according to international practice, when a party to a litigation has adopted a specific position to its own benefit or to the detriment of the other party, under the estoppel principle, it cannot subsequently adopt a different position that contradicts the first one. Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections. Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series No 13, para. 29; Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, para. 49, and Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Dismissed and Retired Employees of the Comptroller’s Office”) v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2009. Series C No. 198, para. 57. In addition, this principle has been used to grant full scope to the acknowledgement of responsibility made by a State or to an agreement signed by the State that it attempted to ignore at later stages of the proceedings. Cf. Case of El Caracazo v. Venezuela. Reparations and costs. Judgment of August 29, 2002. Series C No. 95, para. 52; Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela, para. 49, and Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, para. 49, and Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Dismissed and Retired Employees of the Comptroller’s Office”) v. Peru, para. 57. 12