49. The representatives agreed with the Commission and added that “a judicial restructuring process started in Venezuela in 1999, resulting in the prevalence of the concept of the provisional judge.” Hence, “the so-called ‘restructuring of the Venezuelan Judiciary,’ which, […] eight years on, has not been completed, consists in the removal of judges and the appointment of new ones […] based on political criteria. [Therefore,] it can be said that […] it eliminated all the stability previously enjoyed by Venezuelan judges.” They indicated that the creation of the “Judicial Commission […] launched a third stage of the ‘judicial restructuring,’ adopting a new formula for the removal from office of provisional and temporary judges, [by which] the provisional judges began to be removed in a discretionary manner and without any kind of disciplinary procedure.” In this regard, they concluded that “[t]his mechanism for appointments and removals […] permitted the ‘restructuring’ of the Judiciary, sowing a climate of absolute terror among judges who simply became officials who could be freely appointed and removed.” 50. The State affirmed that “Venezuela has an autonomous, independent and impartial Judiciary.” In this regard, the State indicated that, “since 1999, a process of restructuring the Judiciary has been underway in Venezuela, aimed at adapting it to the principles of the new Constitution”; this entails “competitive examinations to obtain permanent posts, [which] is particularly complex taking into account the number of domestic courts, the new special competences created starting in 2000, and the need for all the competitive examinations to meet constitutional standards.” Hence, the State indicated that, “[t]he process of restructuring the Venezuelan Judiciary required the temporary appointment of judges to cover the existing vacancies and to guarantee the continuity of the system for the administration of justice.” Thus, it reiterated that “[t]hese non-permanent judges have been appointed exceptionally by a decision of the Judicial Emergency Commission, the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court of Justice, or the plenary chamber of the highest court, without taking a competitive examination to obtain the post. […] Consequently, these judges, known as provisional judges, are not on a judicial career path and, therefore, are excluded from the benefits of stability and permanence.” 51. To analyze the description of what happened to Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón and the scope that the parties attribute to the judicial restructuring process in Venezuela in recent years, the Court will now indicate the proven facts with regard to: (1) the general background of the restructuring, and (2) what happened to the alleged victim. Then, the Court will examine the legal disputes. 1. General background 1.1 Principal aspects of the judicial restructuring process in Venezuela 1.1.1. The National Constituent Assembly 52. According to the State, “[b]efore 1999, the Venezuelan Judiciary was experiencing a profound crisis that called into question its independence, autonomy and impartiality.” Based on this and other reasons, a referendum was called which, on April 25, 1999, approved the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly (hereinafter “the Constituent Assembly”), “with a three-fold purpose: (i) to transform the State; (ii) to create a new legal system, and (iii) to achieve the effective functioning of a social and participatory democracy.” 1.1.2. Decree on the Reorganization of the Judiciary 16