opportunity.” It added that; (i) “the appellant became a member of the Judiciary but did not do so through the only way to enter the judicial career established in the Constitution, which is the competitive examination process”; (ii) “since the appellant failed to enter the judicial career, it is clear that […] she did not enjoy the benefits conferred by the judicial career, which include, above all, stability in the exercise of her functions”; (iii) “since the appellant does not enjoy stability in the exercise of the post, it is evident that the body empowered to appoint her could use the same power and, consequently, proceed to revoke freely the appointment. This implies the exercise of a broad discretionary power that has no substantive limits,” and (iv) that the decision adopted did not constitute a disciplinary decision, but rather was “a decision based on reasons of opportunity; reasons that, therefore, cannot be questioned or subject to review.”110 86. On May 5, 2003, Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón filed an administrative appeal for annulment based on unconstitutionality and illegality, together with an application for preventive amparo before the SPA of the SCJ against the decision annulling her appointment.111 She alleged: (i) lack of competence of the Judicial Commission, because “the only body competent to issue administrative decisions in exercise of disciplinary powers [was the current CFRSJ];”112 (ii) the total absence of proceedings, which was supported by the “failure to mention in any section of the decision that is the purpose of the […] appeal for annulment, the result of the opening of any administrative inquiry, or of the procedural rules applicable [to it], or whether the interested party was notified of a preliminary investigation […] so that she could submit her arguments and offer evidence,”113 and (iii) the lack of justification, because the administrative decision on her “removal [was] not founded, and did not even describe the ‘comments presented to [that] court.’”114 In this regard, she argued that the preventive amparo should be granted, because her “right to enjoy stability in the judicial career [was being] violated, and also to be removed or suspended from her post by means of the procedure expressly established by law.”115 87. The SPA of the SCJ declared the administrative appeal for annulment inadmissible116 as follows: In order to clarify the limits of the competence, particularly with regard to the separation of an official of the Judiciary, it is essential to differentiate between the removal arising from a disciplinary decision and when, to the contrary, this occurs through a removal decision, which is equivalent to annulling the appointment. Thus, it should be clarified that, nowadays, the entire disciplinary function (that is, with regard to permanent judges who have achieved guaranteed stability because they have passed the corresponding competitive examination, and with regard to provisional judges) is managed exclusively by the Commission for the Restructuring and Operation of the Judicial System, a transitory body created to act until the disciplinary jurisdiction is 110 Decision of the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court of Justice, supra note 108, folio 482. 111 Appeal for annulment based on unconstitutionality and illegality, together with an application for preventive amparo filed by Mercedes Chocrón, supra note 36, folios 879 to 913. 112 Appeal for annulment based on unconstitutionality and illegality, together with an application for preventive amparo filed by Mercedes Chocrón, supra note 36, folios 901 and 902 113 Appeal for annulment based on unconstitutionality and illegality, together with an application for preventive amparo filed by Mercedes Chocrón, supra note 36, folio 906. 114 Appeal for annulment based on unconstitutionality and illegality, together with an application for preventive amparo filed by Mercedes Chocrón, supra note 36, folio 909. 115 Appeal for annulment based on unconstitutionality and illegality, together with an application for preventive amparo filed by Mercedes Chocrón, supra note 36, folio 911. 116 Judgment No. 01798 of the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of October 19, 2004, (file of attachments to the application, volume I, attachment 35, folios 485 to 500). 28