the right, derived from the Venezuelan Constitution itself and from the American Convention, for the judges deciding their disputes to be and to appear to be independent. Thus, the State must offer the guarantees derived from the principle of judicial independence to both permanent and provisional judges.137 104. The Court reiterates that, although provisional and permanent judges must have the same guarantees (supra para. 103), these guarantees do not entail equal protection for both types of judge, because provisional and temporary judges are, by definition, selected in a different way and their permanence in the post is not indefinite. In this regard, in the Reverón Trujillo case, the Court recognized, as the State is again arguing in this case, that provisional and temporary judges have not demonstrated the conditions and aptitude to exercise the function with the guarantees of transparency imposed by the competitions. However, the Court reiterates that this does not mean that provisional and temporary judges should not have some kind of appointment procedure because, according to the Basic Principles, “[a]ny method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives.”138 105. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that in the same way that the State is obliged to guarantee an appropriate procedure for appointing provisional judges, it must guarantee them a certain tenure in their posts. This Court has stated that the provisional status “must be subject to a resolutive condition, such as fulfillment of a predetermined term, or the holding and completion of a competitive examination to appoint a permanent replacement for the provisional judge.”139 In this way, in the case of provisional judges, the guarantee of tenure translates into a requirement that they may enjoy all the benefits of permanence until the resolutive condition occurs that puts a legal end to their mandate.140 106. Also, in the Reverón Trujillo case, the Court indicated that the tenure of provisional judges is closely related to the guarantee against external pressure, because, if provisional judges do not have the security of permanence during a predetermined term, they will be vulnerable to pressure from different sectors, mainly from those who have the authority to decide on dismissals or promotions in the Judiciary.141 107. Nevertheless, since a review of credentials cannot be equated to a competitive examination, and it cannot be maintained that the stability that comes with a permanent post is the same as the stability that comes with a provisional post with a resolutive condition, this Court has held that provisional appointments must be the exception and not the rule, because prolonging the provisional status of judges or the fact that most judges are provisional gives rise to significant impediments to judicial independence.142 Moreover, the Court has specified that, for the Judiciary to fulfill its function of guaranteeing the greatest suitability of its members, provisional appointments cannot be prolonged indefinitely so that they become permanent appointments. This is another reason why the provisional status is only admissible as the exception and not as the general rule, and why it must be of limited duration in order to be compatible with the right of access to public 137 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 114. 138 Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 115. 139 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 121, para. 43, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 116. 140 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 116. 141 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 117 142 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 121, para. 43, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 118. 34