18. The representatives asked that the preliminary objection be declared inadmissible because the State “did not […] raise the objection” to the alleged failure to exhaust remedies “at the appropriate time” during the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission. They also indicated that Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón “exercised and exhausted all the ordinary domestic mechanisms and proceedings” by filing an appeal for reconsideration before the Judicial Commission and an administrative appeal for annulment before the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. They argued that “the inappropriatelynamed ‘special appeal for review’ referred to by the Venezuelan State is not an ordinary remedy (and not even a special remedy), but rather a discretionary power of the Constitutional Chamber intended to standardize criteria for constitutional interpretation.” Thus, the remedy is “not an instrument that establishes a new ordinary instance where the individual has the right to air his or her personal interests; in other words, it is not an ordinary means of appeal.” In this regard, they indicated that, “[t]he case law of the Constitutional Chamber has always denied that this revisionary power can be used for appeals.” 19. Additionally, the representatives indicated that “the power to review final judgments, established in paragraph 10 of Article 336 of the Constitution, can be exercised ex officio by the Constitutional Chamber itself if it considers, at its own discretion, that its precedents have been ignored. This reveals that, if it did not exercise this power in the case of [Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón], it was because there was no reason to do so; in other words, it was inadmissible.” Furthermore, according to the representatives, “from January 1, 2004, to April 30, 2008, it can be verified that more than 80% of the requests for special review of final judgments were declared INADMISSIBLE” by the Constitutional Chamber. 2. Considerations of the Court 20. The Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties as regards the fact that this preliminary objection was not raised during the proceedings before the Commission. Thus, in keeping with its observations in the case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, the Court notes that the State is seeking that the Court modify its consistent case law which holds that, if the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies is not raised at the appropriate time, the possibility of raising it is lost.12 21. Although the supervision by the Inter-American Court is subsidiary, additional and complementary,13 the Convention itself establishes that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be interpreted in keeping with generallyrecognized principles of international law, which include the principle establishing that the use of this rule is a defense available to the State and, therefore, the procedural moment at which the objection has been submitted must be verified. If the objection is not presented during the admissibility proceedings before the Commission, the State will have forfeited the possibility of using this means of defense before this Court. As indicated in the case of Reverón Trujillo, this has been 12 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 20. 13 Cf. Preamble and Article 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights. See also: The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75). Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A No. 2, para. 31; Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61; Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 195, para. 64, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No 220, para. 10. 8