were summoned to it with only six days’ notice and, in the case of the second vote on the impeachment proceeding of December 8, 2004, the victims were not notified, and did not have the possibility of taking part in the proceeding or exercising their right of defense. 63. In this regard, the Judgment expressly examined the institutional aspect of judicial independence, in order to determine to what extent the collective termination of the judges of the three high courts of Ecuador constituted “an attack not only on judicial independence but also against the democratic order.”82 The ICourtHR reached the conclusion that the members of the Constitutional Tribunal were removed by a resolution of the National Congress, even though it was not empowered to do this, without any legal grounds, and without being heard. It also verified irregularities in the impeachment proceedings, which, in addition, were based on jurisdictional decisions adopted by the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, which was even prohibited by domestic law. 64. The resolution by which it was agreed to terminate the members of the Constitutional Tribunal was the result of a political alliance aimed at creating a judicial apparatus that was favorable to the political majority of the time, as well as to prevent the criminal proceedings against the President in office and a former President. Thus, the resolution of Congress was not adopted based exclusively on the assessment of specific factual information and in order to comply with the laws in force, but had a completely different purpose related to the abuse of power. As the judgment stated: 83 [T]he alliance of the Government in power at the time with the political party headed by former President Bucaram provides an indication of the possible reasons or purpose for wanting to remove the justices of the Supreme Court and the members of the Constitutional Tribunal; particularly, the existence of an interest in annulling the criminal proceedings that the Supreme Court was hearing against former President Bucaram (underlining added). 65. Indeed, the main violations in the instant case constitute an abrupt and totally unacceptable course of action of the political authorities, as the Judgment states, 84 against a basic pillar of the democratic rule of law such as the Judiciary and an authentically independent Constitutional Tribunal. The actions that attacked this essential principle of constitutional democracy represented a disregard for any manifestation of that independence and, therefore, for the principle of the separation of public powers, which is also a cornerstone of the entire protection of the human rights of the individual. A single fact that was found to be proved in this matter is sufficient to reveal the parliamentary abuse of power in this case. This is that, within the space of 14 days, not only the Supreme Court of Ecuador was dismissed, but also the country’s Electoral Tribunal and Constitutional Tribunal, as a result of the political and institutional context in this case, within a framework that was evidently contrary to the democratic rule of law. 66. The Judgment reaches this conclusion to which this opinion has also been referring. Thus, in in paragraph 221, it cites Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, concluding that the dismissal of all the members of the Constitutional Tribunal entailed a destabilization of the existing democratic order in Ecuador, because it involved a rupture of the separation and independence of the public powers by the attack on the three high courts of Ecuador at that time. 82 Para. 207 of the Judgment. 83 Para. 211 of the Judgment. 84 Para. 212 of the Judgment. 16