– as it ended up doing – the approval of the motion of censure with the consequent immediate removal from office of the judges.85 71. The instant case reveals the conditions in which the termination and the impeachment of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal took place, violating the stability of their posts, in the context of external pressures associated with the infringement of the institutional and personal aspects of judicial independence. The proven facts, which reflect an authentic political assault and attack on the basic principles of the democratic rule of law postulated by the inter-American human rights system, reveals the need to emphasize the limits that this international system imposes, not only with regard to the personal aspect of judicial independence, but also with regard to institutional judicial independence, in favor of the eight victims as a group, who composed the Constitutional Tribunal of Ecuador, illegally terminated and tried by the National Congress. VII. THE SUBSTANTIALLY JURISDICTIONAL NATURE OF IMPEACHMENT AND THE VIOLATIONS OF DIFFERENT RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE CONVENTION (ART. 8), POLTICAL RIGHTS (ART. 23) AND JUDICAL PROTECTION (ART. 25) A) Substantially jurisdictional nature of impeachment 72. Traditional legal doctrine distinguishes between “legal control” and “political control.”86 Both types of control form part of “institutionalized controls”; however, the former are objectively determined controls; that is, they are based on legal reasons and on a pre-existing canon that is not available to the organ exercising the control. Thus, legal control applies pre-established limitations; it is a necessary control, because the controlling organ must exercise this control when it is asked to and, if appropriate, issue a sanction; and it is exercised by an independent and impartial body, endowed with exclusive technical competence to decide matters of law. The latter – political control – is subjective in nature, because there is no fixed and predetermined canon of assessment, since it is based on the assessment freely made by the controlling organ, based on reasons of opportunity; it is exercised voluntarily, because the controlling organ or subject is free to exercise the control or not to do so, and it does not necessarily entail the issue of a sanction; and the political body, or the empowered authority or subject is in a situation of supremacy or hierarchy. 87 73. If we follow Aragón’s characterization and we take into account the references that the ICourtHR has cited in relation to the impeachment of judges88 — as happens in numerous countries of the region, where this is carried out by the Legislature 89 — it follows 85 According to article 130(9) of the 1998 Constitution of Ecuador. 86 Among others, see Valadés, Diego, El control del poder, Mexico, UNAM, 1998 (3ra. ed., Porrúa-UNAM, 2006); and Aragón, Manuel, Constitución, democracia y control, Mexico, UNAM, 2002, especially pp. 136 to 141. 87 Aragón, Manuel, op. cit., pp. 130, 131, 136-137. 88 Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, especially paras. 71 to 77. 89 This occurs in various countries that have signed the American Convention, where the impeachment of judges of the high courts is carried out by the Legislature (in a constitutional proceeding of one or two chambers, depending on the country). However, it is relevant not to lose sight of what was said by expert witness Despouy in his statement during the public hearing on March 18, 2013: “…today, the word impeachment is above all a historical reminder of the fact that it used to be the political power, in this case, Congress, generally the Senate in many countries, that made a ruling, those that took the decision, or even the chamber of members of congress and senators that operated as an indictment chamber and a trial chamber; but, today, evolution has determined with growing strength the need to establish independent autonomous bodies” (underlining added). 18