that impeachment constitutes “legal control” as regards the function it performs. Even though it is true that the organ carrying out the impeachment, the type of offenses penalized,90 and the sanctions that can be imposed are political in nature, 91 in the exercise of this function, Congress must act as an independent and impartial organ, complying with the guarantees of due process. Hence, the control exercised by Congress by means of impeachment is of a jurisdictional nature, as an important sector of legal doctrine has accepted.92 Indeed, as Aragon himself asserts, the jurisdictional nature of the organ is a consequence of the type of control and not vice versa. 93 Thus, I consider that we should not confuse the nature of the organ with the nature of the function it exercises in the case of the impeachment of judges. Furthermore, when characterizing the “political control” to which he refers, Aragón cites examples such as that exercised by the electoral body, or that carried out by parliament, or the government over the local entities or the autonomous communities; without referring to the specific element of “impeachment” at any time.94 74. Impeachment takes its inspiration historically from the institution of impeachment in the 1787 Constitution of the United States of America (Article I, section III, paragraph c), according to which the federal Senate “shall try all impeachments” of senior officials of the three branches of Government for political offenses, especially of the federal Constitution. The judgment only entails the removal from office and disqualification from holding office of the official in question. However, since the United States Constitution protects the tenure of federal judges (Article III, section 1), this has taken away its incentive to act against the Judiciary when it is recalled that the records show that it has only tried twice, unsuccessfully, to impeach a federal judge.95 In this regard, it is interesting to recall the characteristics attributed to the Senate in El Federalista LXV when it acts in an impeachment proceeding, which are those of the “judicial nature of the Senate”96 and of an “independent and impartial court.”97 75. Meanwhile, Joseph Story, when commenting on the United States Constitution, and addressing the issue of impeachment began his reflection with the following eloquent words: “The great objects, to be attained in the selection of a tribunal for the trial of 90 We should not lose sight of the fact that, according to international standards, tenure is one of the main guarantees of judicial independence, and can only be infringed in exceptional circumstances, as a result of disciplinary measures established by law, applied by an independent body using a specialized procedure that complies with the guarantees of due process, subject to judicial control. Misconduct or ineptitude are causes for the removal of judges, but not judicial errors. A/HCR/11/41 of 24 March 2008 of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, paras. 52-64. 91 Fix-Zamudio, Héctor, Estudio de la defensa de la Constitución en el ordenamiento mexicano, 2ª ed., México, Porrúa/UNAM, 2011, pp. 190-191. 92 Fix-Zamudio, op. cit., p. 191. Sabsay, Daniel Alberto, “El juicio político a la Corte Suprema en la República argentina”, Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional, 2004, No. 8, p. 506. Arteaga Nava, Elisur, Derecho Constitucional, Mexico, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 701 ss. Huerta Ochoa, Carla, Mecanismos constitucionales para el control del poder político, México, UNAM, 2ª ed., 2001, p. 30. González Oropeza, Manuel, “Juicio político”, in Carbonell, Miguel (coord.), Diccionario de Derecho Constitucional, Mexico, Porrúa/UNAM, 2002, p. 335. Orozco Henríquez, J. Jesús, “Artículo 110”, Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Comentada y concordada, 18ª ed., México, Porrúa/UNAM, t. IV, 2004, p. 195. 93 Ibidem, p. 137. 94 Aragón, Manuel, op. cit., pp. 173-174. 95 The last time that a federal judge was subjected to impeachment was long ago, in 1805. Cf. Artola, Miguel, Constitucionalismo en la historia, Barcelona, Ed. Crítica, 2005, pp. 252-253. 96 Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J., op. cit., pp. 277. 97 Ibidem, p. 278. 19