an abuse of power aimed at obtaining control of the judicial function by different procedures; in this case, the termination and the impeachment proceedings (underlining added). 108. To the contrary, in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, it was not possible to reach this conclusion because the concept of “abuse of power” requires the respective organ to have competence to adopt the measure regarding which the “unstated” reasons are analyzed.138 Meanwhile, in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Congress did have competence to hold the impeachment proceedings. 109. Nevertheless, I consider that, in both the case of the Supreme Court of Justice v. Ecuador (Quintana Coello et al.)139 and in this case of the Constitutional Tribunal, the ICourtHR could have analyzed the violation of Article 9 of the Pact of San José, despite the lack of competence of the National Congress to terminate the justices of the Supreme Court of Justice and the lack of competence to determine the legality of the appointment of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal. Indeed, irrespective of whether Congress was incompetent to carry out the removals, it should not be overlooked that, in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, the State acknowledged that it had held an ad hoc sanction proceeding while, in the instant case, the State acknowledged the violation of Article 9 of the American Convention, because it considered that “it did not have grounds determined by law to remove the presumed victims from office,” and owing to “the absence of legal certainty with regard to the grounds for the removal of the former judges.” In this situation, since it was clearly an ad hoc proceeding and given the State’s acquiescence in this case, I consider that the possible violation of the principle of legality could have been analyzed in the case of both terminations. 110. In my opinion, in the Judgment that prompts this opinion, the “abuse of power” could have been examined with greater precision and from a different viewpoint. Not only from the perspective of the institutional aspect of judicial independence – as occurs in the Judgment140 — but, in particular, by an analysis of the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention. This is because the State acknowledged its international responsibility with regard to the violation of this principle,141 and also because, in the Judgment, the ICourtHR — when analyzing the scope of the State’s partial acknowledgement of responsibility – considered that “some of the disputes on this point remain.”142 Hence, I find insufficient the justification given in the Judgment to establish that “it is not necessary to make a detailed analysis of the arguments of the parties concerning whether the termination decision constituted a punitive act, and other aspects related to the possible implications that the principle of legality would have had in this case.”143 111. Given the evident “harm to the separation of powers and the arbitrary nature of the actions of Congress” that the Judgment expressly indicates,144 the competence of the 138 Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C, No. 266, para. 162. 139 Cf. My Concurring Opinion in the Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C No. 266. 140 Paras. 188 to 199, and 207 to 221 of the Judgment. 141 Para. 14 of the Judgment. 142 Para. 22 of the Judgment. 143 Para. 223 of the Judgment. 144 Ibidem. 30