10 constitutes the factual framework of the proceeding.22 The purpose of that possibility is to make the locus standi in judicio procedural capacity effective, as recognized for the alleged victims, their next of kin or their representatives in the Rules of Procedure, without disregarding the limits established in the Convention regarding their participation or the exercise of the competence of the Court or diminishing or violating the State’s right to defense, as the State has procedural opportunities to respond to the pleadings of the Commission and of the representatives at all stages of the proceeding. It is ultimately for the Court to decide in each case on the legal basis of a claim of such nature, in safekeeping of the procedural balance among the parties.23 33. Moreover, the application serves as a frame for the legal claims and the claims for reparations. That is to say, the timely procedural moment for the defendant State to accept or contest the central subject of the litigation is in its answer to the Commission’s application. Likewise, the procedural moment that allows the alleged victims, their family members or representatives to fully exercise their right of locus standi in judicio, is the brief with pleadings, motions and evidence.24 34. The Court notes that, in effect, the representatives have alleged the violation of other rights not contained in the application, namely, the right to property and the right to equal protection, respectively recognized in Articles 21 and 24 of the Convention. Based on the foregoing, the inclusion of these arguments is part of the exercise of the procedural capacity, therefore these arguments shall be considered by the Court as long as they refer and limit to the facts contained in the application. Consequently, the Court rejects the second preliminary objection raised by the State. C) THIRD PRELIMINARY OBJECTION “On the prejudice in the roles played by some judges of the Court” 35. In the third preliminary objection raised by the State, the State requested the Court that Judges Cecilia Medina Quiroga and Diego García-Sayán be “disqualified from hearing" the instant case. In order to support such request, the State referred to, inter alia, the existing relationship between the Judges and a non-governmental organization. The State mentioned that one of the lawyers that legally represent the alleged victims in this case is the president of that organization and director of the board of directors According to the State’s opinion, Judges Medina and García-Sayán would have already made, together with the rest of the members that form part of that organization, prior negative opinions against the State and attempted to discredit it, which constitute an aspect that “compromise the impartiality of the judges at the time of giving a verdict in the instant case.” 21 Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners" v. Perú, supra note 20, para. 155; Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, supra note 20 para. 174; and Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panamá, supra note 20, para. 228. 22 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Serie C No. 134, para. 59; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 21; and Case of Bayarri v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 30, 2008. Series C Nº 187, para. 30. 23 Cf. Case of the “Maripirán Massacre” v. Colombia, supra nota 22, para. 58; Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panamá, supra note 21, para. 228; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006, Series C No. 148, para. 89. 24 Cf. Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haití. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 18.