87 278. In light of the relationship between violence and discrimination, the Commission noted that “the failure to punish an act of violence against women may also constitute a form of discrimination.” Accordingly, the Commission argued that, “given that non-consensual sterilization is a form of violence against women, the State should have acted with due diligence to investigate and punish those responsible for it.” However, in this case, “no punishment was ordered against those responsible for the non-consensual sterilization performed on I.V.” Consequently, the Commission considered that “the lack of punishment in this case constitutes a violation of the obligations established in Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará and, at the same time, a form of discrimination against I.V.” It also considered “that the numerous delays and instances of negligence attributable to the Judiciary during the criminal proceedings regarding the sterilization performed on I.V., which resulted in the extinction of the criminal action, violated the obligations established in paragraphs (f) and (g) of the said Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará.” On this basis, the Commission concluded “that, in this matter, the State violated the duty to refrain from any practice or act of violence against women, thereby contravening the obligations established in Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and failed to abide by its duty to act with the necessary due diligence to punish these kinds of acts.” 279. The representative agreed with the legal grounds and conclusions set forth by the Commission in its Merits Report in relation to the violation of Article 7 (a, b, c, f and g) of the Convention of Belém do Pará. 280. With regard to the obligation to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish violence against women, the State indicated that it had “acted with due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish the presumed violence against I.V., because she had been able to have recourse to the corresponding instances to assert her right” and it had “complied with its obligations established in Article 7(b) of the Convention, because in light of treaty-based law, the State had not promoted or consented to any type of violence against I.V.” 281. Regarding the obligation to establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence, which include measures of protection, a prompt trial, and effective access to such proceedings and also to establish the necessary administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure that a woman who has been the subject of violence has effective access to redress, reparation of the harm, or other just and effective measures of compensation, the State observed that “using the appropriate remedies, at both the administrative and the judicial level, I.V. was able to assert her claims in accordance with the legal framework in force and, although the result was not favorable to her, this does not mean that the State had not provided adequate and effective remedies for her protection; to the contrary, I.V. was provided with both ordinary and special remedies that she failed to file or exhaust.” Based on these considerations, the State concluded that it was not responsible for the alleged violation of Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, because it had complied with its treaty-based obligations to protect women and, in particular, to ensure that I.V. had full access to justice. A.3 Arguments on discrimination in access to justice 282. The Commission reiterated that “States have a duty to guarantee appropriate access to justice for women when any of their human rights are violated, including those relating to their sexual and reproductive health. There are two dimensions associated with this duty. The first is criminal sanctions when acts occur that may constitute a form of violence against women. […] A second dimension has to do with the need to address the causes and systemic flaws that gave rise to the human rights violation under review. The impunity of violations of women's rights – including their sexual and reproductive rights – constitutes a form of discrimination against them and undermines the obligation not to discriminate included in Article 1(1) of the American Convention.” Consequently, in this case, the Commission argued that “the denial of justice for I.V. derived from procedural