36 criminal proceedings arising from the crimes of “homicide and against personal liberty […] coincided, as regards their inception, at the time of death,” more than 20 years previously. According to the Second Superior Court, this was the date on which the statute of limitations for the criminal proceedings began to run.96 In addition, that court found that the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons was not pertinent as regards the non-applicability of the statute of limitations to this type of offense, because the relevant facts occurred prior to its signature by the State.97 134. The Third Prosecutor’s Office filed an appeal against the preceding decision before the Supreme Court of Justice, arguing that an unlawful act could only be subject to a statute of limitations as of the moment it was examined by a competenceal body and not before, and affirming that the criminal case in question referred to “an offense that had been committed with permanent effects. Although it was true that it materialized at a specific, yet unknown, moment, its effects subsisted until the existence of the unlawful act was known or, in other words, until it was examined by a competenceal body.”98 On March 2, 2004, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice decided the appeal filed before it and revoked the decision of June 13, 2003 (supra para. 133), ordered an expansion of the preliminary proceedings consisting in taking the sworn statement of Manuel Antonio Noriega, and declared that the criminal proceedings were not subject to a statute of limitations.99 In this decision, the Supreme Court declared that, in the case of the criminal proceedings, the statute of limitations could not begin until the competenceal bodies had examined the unlawful act.100 As grounds for the foregoing, the Supreme Court based itself on the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance, Article VII of which indicates that the “criminal action for the forced disappearance of persons and the penalty judicially imposed on its perpetrator shall not be subject to statutes of limitations.” In addition, the Supreme Court stated that the non-applicability of the statute of limitations to the criminal action in a case of forced disappearance was based on: The importance for society and its right to know what happened to persons who disappeared as a result of their political ideas. Hence, in this regard, under no circumstance can the criminal principles of legality and non-retroactivity of criminal laws operate, because as the Nuremberg Court stated at the time, “the Court does not create law; it merely applies the law that already exists. […]101 135. Also, as indicated above, the Supreme Court considered that it would not be pertinent to grant a dismissal in this case based on the application of the statute of limitations to the criminal action when, “at the time of Heliodoro Portugal’s forced disappearance, a regime was in power that prevented free access to justice.”102 96 Cf. judicial order No. 167 issued by the Second Superior Court, supra note 38, fs. 246. 97 Cf. judicial order No. 167 issued by the Second Superior Court, supra note 38, fs. 247. 98 Appeal filed before the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on July 30, 2003, by the Third Superior Prosecutor’s Office of the First Judicial District of Panama (file of appendixes to the application, appendixes 1 and 2, appendix 34, fs. 257 to 285). 99 Cf. judgment of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of March 2, 2004, supra note 38, fs. 287 to 297. 100 Cf. judgment of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of March 2, 2004, supra note 38, f. 293. 101 Cf. judgment of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of March 2, 2004, supra note 38, fs. 294 and 295. 102 Cf. judgment of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of March 2, 2004, supra note 38, f. 295.