53 obligation to define torture as an offense, derived from Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Convention against Torture, an obligation they alleged is also derived from Articles 2, 4, 7, 8 and 25 of the American Convention. They supported their argument, by stating that “the State has been a party to the Convention against Torture since August 28, 1991, and that, as of that moment, the State had the obligation to define torture and attempts to commit acts of torture as offenses, establishing severe penalties to punish them, that take into account their seriousness.” According to the representatives, the State has not yet complied with this obligation. 211. The State indicated that Article 432 of the new Penal Code establishes torture, among other acts, as an autonomous offense and penalizes it with 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment, the most severe punishment contained in the new legislative text. 212. The Commission did not present arguments in this regard. However, the Court reiterates that the representatives may invoke different rights to those included in the Commission’s application, based on the facts presented by the Commission (infra paras. 226 and 227);165 this also applies to allegations regarding other instruments that grant the Court competence to declare violations arising from the facts that are the purpose of the application.166 213. Article 6 of the Convention against Torture establishes the obligation for all States Parties to ensure that “all acts of torture and attempts to commit torture are defined as offenses under their criminal law, and shall make such acts punishable by severe penalties that take into account their serious nature”. Likewise Article 8 of that Convention indicates that “if there is an accusation or well-grounded reason to believe that an act of torture has been committed within their competence, the States Parties shall guarantee that their respective authorities will proceed properly and immediately to conduct an investigation into the case and to initiate, whenever appropriate, the corresponding criminal process.” The above relates to the general obligation to “prevent and punish torture,” contained in Article 1 of that Convention, which entered into force for the State on September 28, 1991. 214. The Penal Code in force in Panama since 1983 does not define the offense of torture specifically, but rather, its Article 160 establishes, under the heading of “Crimes against Personal Liberty” that the “public servant who subjects a detainee to undue coercion or hardships shall be penalized with from 6 to 20 months’ imprisonment. If the act consists of torture, dishonorable punishment, humiliation or arbitrary measures, the punishment shall be from 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment.” Article 154 of the new Penal Code shares the same language, the only difference being that the term of imprisonment was increased from 5 to 8 years. 215. Although the said Articles of the Panamanian Penal Codes indicate a punishment of imprisonment when an act consists of torture, the text of these Articles does not elaborate on the elements that constitute this offense. Additionally, Article 160 of the 1983 Code and Article 154 of the new Penal Code merely refer to the conduct of public officials and only when the victim has been detained. Hence, these Articles do not contemplate the criminal responsibility of any other “person, who at the instigation of a public servant or employee […] orders, instigates, or induces the use of torture, directly commits it, or is an accomplice 165 Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners” v. Perú. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 155; and Case of the Saramaka People, supra note 6, para. 27, and Case of Salvador Chiriboga, supra note 6, para. 128. 166 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Perú. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2006. Series C No. 160, para. 265.