adoption of such limitation.” 92 The Court recalls that such restrictions are exceptional in nature and should not limit the full exercise of freedom of expression more than strictly necessary and become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship. 93 73. The Court has established that it is possible to impose such subsequent liability if the right to honor and reputation has been harmed. 94 Thus, Article 11 of the Convention establishes that everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. The Court has indicated that the right to honor “recognizes that everyone has the right to respect for this, prohibits any unlawful attack on honor or reputation, and imposes on the States the duty to provide legal protection against any such attacks.” In general, the Court has indicated that “the right to honor is related to self-esteem and selfworth, while reputation relates to the opinion that others have of a person.” 95 Accordingly, the Court has recognized that “both freedom of expression and the right to have one’s honor respected, two rights protection by the Convention, are extremely important. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure both rights so that they coexist harmoniously.” 96 Each fundamental right must be exercised respecting and safeguarding the other fundamental rights. Consequently, the Court has indicated that “the resolution of any conflict arising between two rights requires weighing one against the other and, to this end, examining each case in accordance with its specific characteristics and circumstances, considering the existence and extent of the elements on which the decision is based.” 97 74. The Court recalls in this regard that, to determine the compatibility with the Convention of a restriction of freedom of expression when this clashes with the right to honor, it is of vital importance to analyze whether the statements made are of public interest because, in such cases, the judge must assess the need to limit freedom of expression with special care. 98 In its case law, the Court has considered that public interest relates to those opinions or that information on matters regarding which society has a legitimate interest to be informed, in order to be aware of anything that bears on the performance of the State or impacts on general interests or rights, or that has significant consequences. 99 The determination of the foregoing has consequences on the analysis of the conventionality of the restriction of the right to freedom of expression, because statements related to matters of public interest – such as those concerning the suitability of an individual to exercise public office or the actions of public officials in the exercise of their functions – enjoy greater protection in order to encourage democratic Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 83, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 108. 92 93 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 120, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 100. Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 123, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 100. 94 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 57, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 101. 95 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 51, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 102. 96 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 51, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 102. 97 98 109. Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 145, and Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, supra, para. Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 121; Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 121, and Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, supra, para. 110. 99 24