debate. 100 75. Thus, the Court has indicated that, in a democratic society, those individuals who have an impact on matters of public interest are more exposed to the public’s scrutiny and censure. This different threshold of protection is explained by the fact that their activities extend beyond the private domain to enter the realm of public debate and, therefore, they have voluntarily laid themselves open to this more intense scrutiny. 101 This in no way means that the honor of those who take part in matters of public interest should not be protected by law, but that this protection should be accorded pursuant to the principles of democratic pluralism. 102 76. Furthermore, regarding the necessary nature and rigorous analysis of proportionality that must govern decisions involving the limitation of the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the right to honor, it is essential to seek the intervention that – while most appropriate to restore the damaged reputation – also minimizes the harm to freedom of expression. 103 Accordingly, in the context of freedom of information, the Court considers that journalists have a duty to verify reasonably, although not necessarily exhaustively, the facts they divulge. 104 That said, this does not signify a strict requirement of veracity, at least as regards matters of public interest, recognizing as a disclaimer that the publication was made in good faith or with justification, and always respecting minimum standards of professional ethics in pursuit of the truth. 105 Moreover, the Court notes that, for investigative journalism to exist in a democratic society, journalists must be allowed “room for error” because, without this margin of error, neither independent journalism nor the possibility of the necessary democratic scrutiny that results from this can exist. 106 77. In addition, the Court considers that no one may be subject to subsequent liability for the dissemination of information related to a public matter that is based on material that is accessible to the public or derived from official sources. 107 78. Lastly, it should also be underlined that, if it is considered appropriate to award Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 128, and Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 47. 100 101 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 129, and Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 115. 102 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 128. Cf. Expert opinion provided by Joan Barata Mir at the public hearing held on February 14, 2022, during the Court’s 146th regular session. 103 104 Ver, mutatis mutandis, Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 79. Cf. mutatis mutandis, Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 127, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 82. According to expert witness Joan Barata: “the idea of veracity refers to the idea of informational diligence and, above all, also of a subjective element which is the intention to do everything possible to get as close to the truth as possible in the exercise of reasonable diligence in good faith.” Expert opinion provided by Joan Barata Mir at the public hearing held on February 14, 2022, during the Court’s 146th regular session. 105 Cf. Expert opinion provided by Joan Barata Mir at the public hearing held on February 14, 2022, during the Court’s 146th regular session. 106 107 Cf. ECHR, inter alia, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GS], no. 21980/93, Judgment of May 20, 1999, paras. 68 and 72; Selistö v. Finland, no. 56767/00, Judgment of November 16, 2004, para. 60; Colombani and Others v. France, no. 51279/99, Judgment of June 25, 2002, para. 65; Godlevskiy v. Russia, no. 14888/03, Judgment of October 23, 2008, para. 47, and Yordanova and Toshev v. Bulgaria, no. 5126/05, Judgment of October 2, 2012, para. 51. 25