115. Regarding this request, the Court finds that the delivery of this judgment and the reparations ordered in this chapter are sufficient and adequate to redress the violations suffered by the victims. E. Compensation 116. In its case law, the Court has developed the concept of pecuniary damage and has established that this entails the loss of or detriment to the income of the victims, the expenses incurred as a result of the facts, and the consequences of a pecuniary nature that have a causal nexus to the facts of the case. 133 117. The Court has also established in its case law that non-pecuniary damage “may include both the suffering and affliction caused by the violations, and also the impairment of values of great significance to the individual, and any alteration of a non-pecuniary nature in the living conditions of the victims.” Moreover, as it is not possible to allocate a precise monetary equivalent to non-pecuniary damage, it can only be compensated, for the purposes of full reparation to the victim, by the payment of a sum of money or the delivery of goods or services of a monetary value, that the Court determines in reasonable application of sound judicial discretion and based on equity. 134 118. The Commission recommended providing full reparation, both pecuniary and nonpecuniary, for the human rights violations declared in the Merits Report. 119. The representatives asked the Court to establish compensation for both the pecuniary damage (consequential damage and loss of earnings) and the non-pecuniary or moral damage suffered by the victims. Regarding the pecuniary damage, they asked that the sentence and all its effects be annulled, requiring the reimbursement of the amounts imposed by that ruling and paid by La Nación due to the civil conviction to pay damages of ₡5,000,000.00 colones (five million colones) and to pay procedural costs of ₡1,000,000.00 (one million colones). Regarding the non-pecuniary damage, they asked for compensation of US$50,000.00 (fifty thousand United States dollars) for each victim. 120. The State indicated that the alleged victims had not proved that they had made any disbursements from their own assets, or that their income had been impaired owing to the civil compensation imposed by the civil judgment convicting them. It noted that the joint and several sentence to pay 5 million colones had been paid by La Nación and not by the alleged victims, and that there was no evidence of a “risk of a claim for restitution” by this newspaper, so that the assets of the journalists were not affected. It noted that, in their pleadings and motions brief, the representatives had not provided any evidence to substantiate the assertion that there had been “emotional damage and reputational harm” other than the testimony of the direct interested parties. It added that this was supported by the fact that Messrs. Moya and Parrales had continued to work as journalists without interruption and that, as confirmed by the statement of witness Armando González, following the civil compensation payment, there had been no change of any kind in the way they practiced journalism. Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of February 22, 2002. Series C No. 91, para. 43, and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 192. 133 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 77, para. 84, and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 197. 134 34