15. In 2008, the Court reiterated and developed its understanding of the use of criminal measures against freedom of expression in the case of Kimel v. Argentina (2008). In its acknowledgement of responsibility, the State admitted that the definition of certain offenses was imprecise and, therefore, incompatible with the Convention, which requires correct and specific legality. The Court accepted the State’s acknowledgement and indicated that the “broad definition of the offenses of libel and defamation might be contrary to the principles of ultima ratio of criminal law and minimum criminalization.” In this regard, even though the Court did not establish that any definition of offenses against honor would necessarily be contrary to the Convention, 8 it indicated that: this possibility should be carefully analyzed, pondering the extreme seriousness of the conduct of the individual who expressed the opinion, the malice with which he acted, the characteristics of the harm unjustly caused, and other information that reveals the absolute necessity of, exceptionally, resorting to criminal measures. At all times, the burden of proof must fall on the party who files the complaint. 9 16. On this issue, I consider it essential to recall the reflections of Judge García Ramírez in his concurring opinion in the Kimel case. The judge reiterated the proposal made in his opinion in the case of Herrera Ulloa that it was necessary to determine the (in)adequacy of criminal law to combat possible excesses in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and underscored that the existence of adequate and less harmful alternatives to control excesses in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression made criminal proceedings unnecessary and incompatible with the Convention. 10 17. It is also worth stressing the Court’s decision, when determining the reparations applicable in the Kimel case, not only to require the annulment of the conviction under domestic law (a measure that had already been adopted), but also to establish, in extreme cases, the State’s obligation to amend its domestic laws to align the definition of the offenses of defamation and libel to inter-American standards. Consequently, as the Court acknowledged, Argentina amended its Criminal Code to preclude the criminalization of expressions and opinions on matters of public interest, thus eliminating the sanction of imprisonment owing to defamation, among other measures in favor of the right to freedom of expression in compliance with the judgment in this case 11 – and, subsequently, also in the case of Mémoli v. Argentina in 2013. 12 18. In 2012, in the case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela, the Court reinforced what it had already indicated in the case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay; in particular, that the very existence of criminal proceedings gives rise to an inhibiting and chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression contrary to the State obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of freedom of expression in a democratic society. 13 19. The Court has recently returned to the issue of the use of criminal measures to regulate excesses in the exercise of freedom of expression in the case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela (2019), in which the applicant had been convicted of the offense of aggravated defamation 8 Also in Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina (§55) and Mémoli v. Argentina (§126). IACtHR. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008, §78. Understanding reiterated, inter alia, in Mémoli v. Argentina (§139). 9 10 Idem. Opinion of Judge García Ramírez, §§ 18-20. Cf. IACtHR. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Monitoring compliance with judgment. Order of the Court of May 18, 2010, considering paragraph 35. 11 12 The Court also took note of the change in Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina (§95). 13 IACtHR. Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela. Judgment of September 3, 2012. §189.