interpretation frequently result not only in an excessive use of criminal law, but also in a direct affront to the basic precepts of a free and well-ordered society, such as the principle of minimum criminalization. 34. At this point, it is important to underline that often, and in a way that is of particular concern, judicial protection in cases of offenses against honor is exercised by private criminal actions filed by the alleged victim on a highly discretionary basis. In other words, the opening of criminal proceedings against someone for offenses of this nature does not depend on the initiative of a state entity with special prerogatives of autonomy, such as the Public Prosecution Service, but on a simple criminal complaint filed by the alleged victim. This makes it much easier to use criminal measures to intimidate, inhibit or have a chilling effect on expressions of freedom of expression, even if such measures do not result in a conviction, and especially in the context of newspaper articles resulting from investigative journalism on matters of public interest. 35. In the instant case, even though the victims were not criminally convicted, and despite the significant interpretative dispute concerning the validity of article 7 of the Costa Rican Printing Act, criminal proceedings were opened against the two men. It is important to consider that the international community understands that a criminal conviction is not required in order to execute this subtle violation of the sphere of free expression; criminal proceedings and the reasonable perspective of an unfavorable result, per se shameful, is sufficient to impair the right to freedom of expression. And, it is the so-called chilling effect 30 that, per se, constitutes a veiled form of obstruction of the exercise of journalistic freedom of expression; moreover, it discourages the investigation and dissemination of information of public interest. If the domestic jurisdiction is not already prudent with regard to the assessment of the substantive nature of the offense or the subjective elements of the criminalized conduct, greater is the power of intimidation that results from the filing of the proceedings, because greater is the risk of a conviction. 36. The European Court has also indicated that, in addition to inhibiting the free circulation of information for society as a whole, the chilling effect is also an obstructive factor that must be considered when examining the proportionality of measures that restrict the right to freedom of expression and, thus, the justification of the eventual sanctions imposed on media professionals. 31 Ultimately, as the European Court has stated, for example, in Bozhkov v. Bulgaria, “if the national courts apply an overly rigorous approach to the assessment of journalists’ professional conduct, the latter could be unduly deterred from discharging their function of keeping the public informed.” 32 Moreover, in the case of Morice v. France, the European Court declared that, the relatively moderate nature of the criminal sanction did not suffice to negate the risk of a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression. 33 37. On this point, in paragraph 52 of their brief with pleadings, motions and evidence, the representatives argued that “the dissuasive and perverse effect of subjecting the victims to 30 “The threat of criminal sanctions, in particular imprisonment, exerts a chilling effect on freedom of expression. Prison sentences, suspended prison sentences, suspension of the right to express oneself through any particular form of media or to practise journalism or any other profession, excessive fines and other harsh criminal penalties should never be available as a sanction for breach of defamation laws.” Civil and political rights, including the question of freedom of expression: The right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur, Ambeyi Ligabo (2006). E/CN.4/2006/55. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/G06/100/26/PDF/G0610026.pdf?OpenElement. 31 ECHR. Case of Kaperzynski v. Poland, of April 3, 2012. Similarly, also: Case of Lewandowska-Malec v. Poland. Judgment of September 18, 2012. 32 ECHR. Case of Bozhkov v. Bulgaria. Judgment of April 19, 2011, §51 33 ECHR. Case of Morice v. France. Judgment of April 23, 2015, §127