distress directly caused by the very existence of the law in force owing to the constant risk of being criminally prosecuted due to his sexual orientation. The European Court considered that the very existence of the law constituted an unjustified interference in the right to respect for his private life, in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court also considered that the fact that Mr. Dudgeon had been questioned reinforced his fear of criminal prosecution, but was not essential for determining the violation. 47 56. In a subsequent case concerning the same laws in the United Kingdom, the ECHR reinforced its understanding and added: A law which remains on the statute book, even though it is not enforced in a particular class of cases for a considerable time, may be applied again in such cases at any time, if for example there is a change of policy. The applicant can therefore be said to “run the risk of being directly affected” by the legislation in question. 48 57. Thus, it is evident that the existence of a law may, per se, violate the international instruments that protect human rights. 58. In the instant case, the situation stands out as meriting greater attention. In the preceding paragraphs, I have had occasion to focus on the so-called chilling effect of the use of criminal sanctions that target the exercise of journalism. In other words, when freedom of expression is involved, the mere establishment of criminal norms that are potentially repressive may be more detrimental to the human rights of journalists. 59. Having set out these observations and caveats concerning the uncertainty as to whether or not article 7 was applicable, a matter that arose during the processing of this case, it is now necessary to make a more detailed analysis of the sub-categories that compose this article and that motivated the warning given by this Court. a. The non-applicability of the aggravated category to offenses of libel and defamation 60. The first sub-category established in article 7, aimed at suppressing offenses against honor committed through the press, prescribes a more specific and harsher punitive provision than the general offense establish by articles 145 and 146 of the Criminal Code. Thus, the Printing Act stipulates a more severe form of criminal liability imposed on journalists and other media professionals; indeed, it imposes on them a harsher punishment than it imposes on any other individual whose conduct may be included in the definition of the offenses of libel or defamation under the Criminal Code. 61. It appears that the intention of the legislator was to confer a more rigorous protection of criminal law owing to the broader scope of the harm to someone’s honor when it is perpetrated by the media. 62. However, in practice, the law establishes a more restrictive sanction only and exclusively in function of the exercise of a fundamental human right and of the professional role of the person exercising that right. 63. In this regard, it should be taken into account that the legal protection granted to 47 Indeed, that Court reiterated its decision in the Case of Norris v. Ireland, in which the victim had not been the subject of any police measure. (Cf. ECHR. Case of Norris v. Ireland. Judgment of October 26, 1988. §38). 48 ECHR. Case of Norris v. Ireland. Judgment of October 26, 1988. § 33.