80. That said, article 7 of the Printing Act does not establish clear parameters for defining the offense in question, or its elements. Owing to its imprecise, indeterminate and unclear nature, it is not possible to predict, with certainty, in which cases it would be lawful or criminal to report or publish matters of public interest, as published in the article in La Nación. Thus, as indicated by the IACHR, “the imprecision of the norm opened the way to the use of criminal law to generate an intimidating environment that inhibited discourse and discussion on matters of public interest.” 57 81. From the perspective of the rights to freedom of expression and of the press, it can be seen that these sub-categories of article 7 of the Printing Act propose that the whole functional organization of a media outlet, from the journalist who wrote the article to the owner of the newspaper, should incur criminal liability. 82. Accordingly, it is difficult to reconcile the wording of the Costa Rican law with the social dimension of freedom of expression. Moreover, on several occasions, this Court has recognized the essential role that the media plays in democratic societies, such as in the case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru: 149. The Court considers that both dimensions are of equal importance and should be guaranteed simultaneously in order to give total effect to the right to freedom of expression in the terms of Article 13 of the Convention. The importance of this right is further underlined if we examine the role that the media plays in a democratic society, when it is a true instrument of freedom of expression and not a way of restricting it; consequently, it is vital that it can gather the most diverse information and opinions. 83. Ultimately, establishing offenses that are not based on the principle of guilt in order to affect the internal organization of a newspaper constitutes a provision that would appear to deviate from the standards established by the Court. Norms of this nature may also reveal a veiled and unnecessary negative animus against the very exercise of press freedom objectively considered. In this context, criminal law cannot serve as a dissuasive mechanism addressed at the media for what constitutes the legitimate exercise of its role: the dissemination of information of public interest. c. Partial conclusion 84. In the instant case, as explained in the text of this opinion, I am setting out these considerations in obiter dicta. I join the other members of the Court to speak with one voice when affirming the international responsibility of the Costa Rican State for the unjust civil conviction of F.P.C. and R.M.C. for newspaper articles published in the normal and legitimate exercise of the right to press freedom. 85. Nevertheless, based on a criterion of judicial prudence, I did not find it specifically necessary, for the time being, to proclaim the anti-conventionality of article 7 of the Costa Rican Printing Act, owing to the special circumstance – which I consider relevant – that a reasonable interpretative dissent exists within the jurisdiction of the State Party itself with regard to the effective validity of the said criminal norm. 86. I would also like to point out, in defense of the adequacy of the reparations unanimously indicated by the Court, that the consequences under criminal law of the situation were accidentally lessened in the domestic jurisdiction by the introduction of the evidentiary 57 IACHR. Case of Moya Chacón v. Costa Rica. Merits Report No. 148/19, §77.