or court to get a clear and real picture of his or her assets at the time bail is set, based on those assets. The court cannot be expected to assume, as a general rule, that a defendant is a person of either modest or fair economic means or circumstances.”8 82. The State argued that as the petitioners acknowledge, the precautionary measures ordered against Ms. Andrade in certain criminal cases were canceled and the property returned, in keeping with Article 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That article states that precautionary measures shall be lifted when: 1) the decision to require bail is revoked; 2) the accused is acquitted or the case against the accused is dismissed, or 3) the record in the case is closed by a final decision not subject to appeal. The State argues that in accordance with that article, the precautionary measures in the Mallasa and Mendieta cases were lifted because the case against Ms. Andrade was dismissed. The State argued that a precondition for lifting precautionary measures is the accused’ interest and initiative, which was not present in the other cases in which Ms. Andrade is standing trial, even when the court ordered the case against her dismissed. 83. As for the alleged violation of Article 22 of the American Convention, by denying Ms. Andrade a passport, ordering her confined to the court’s jurisdiction, and prohibiting her from traveling beyond La Paz, the State argued that an order confining a person to the court’s jurisdiction is a precautionary measure of a personal nature intended as an alternative to pre-trial detention. Its purpose in a given case is to ensure that the accused is present for the inquiry into the facts, the prosecution of the case and the enforcement of the law. The State pointed out in this regard that under Article 240(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when pre-trial detention is not the proper precautionary measure but the risk of flight or obstruction of the proceedings exists, the judge or the court may issue a well-reasoned decision ordering the use of the alternative measure of “Prohibiting the person concerned from leaving the country, the place in which he or she resides or the area prescribed by the judge or the court, without the court’s or judge’s authorization, and conveying said order to the competent authorities.” The State alleged that the order confining Ms. Adrade to the court’s jurisdiction meets the tests of being a proportionate, legitimate, temporary measure of last resort, as established in Article 240 of the CPP. It observed that this measure is never definitive, since it can be changed anytime from the start of the criminal process, as stipulated in Article 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 84. The State further alleged that this measure could have been suspended temporarily had the alleged victim so requested; in other words, once the measure is ordered, the judge or court can authorize an exception to allow the accused or the defendant to go beyond the boundary set in the order confining her to the court’s jurisdiction. It pointed that the order confining a person to the court’s jurisdiction is one of the precautionary measures available to a court and its purpose is to protect the criminal proceedings necessary in the investigation, to help advance prosecution of the case and enforce the law. By way of example, the State pointed out that in the criminal case known as the Street Lamps Case, Ms. Andrade filed a request for authorization to go to Chumani for health reasons; she later requested that the order confining her to the court’s jurisdiction be temporarily lifted for work-related reasons. The judges evaluated the request in December 2001, and granted it. 85. The State concluded, therefore, that there are no grounds to allege a violation of the right to freedom of movement and residence under Articles 22(1) and 22(2) of the American Convention, less still to claim the State’s failure to provide effective and suitable remedies under domestic law. 86. In March 2012, the State reported on the status of the cases against the alleged victim. With regard to the Gader case, the State pointed out that on January 18, 2007, a provisional order was issued in which the case against Ms. Andrade was dismissed, whereupon the Government of La Paz filed an appeal. For the examining phase, the case was randomly assigned to the Second Criminal Chamber, which recused itself; the case was then referred to the Third Criminal Chamber, which issued a ruling upholding the decision to drop the case against Ms. Andrade. Then, on August 19, 2010, the Government of La Paz, as a victim and in accordance with the provisions of the CPP, requested that the case be reopened, attaching as evidence 8 The State is referring to the constitutional precedent contained in Constitutional Court Judgment No. 162/2002-R of February 27, 2002.