Article 235. (Danger of Obstruction). By danger of obstruction is understood every circumstance that makes it possible to state with foundation that the accused, with his or her conduct, will thwart the inquiry into the truth. To decide whether it is present, one will conduct a full evaluation of the existing circumstances, mindful in particular of the following: 1. That the accused destroys, modifies, hides, suppresses, and/or falsifies evidence; 2. That the accused has a negative influence on the participants, witnesses, or expert witnesses for them to provide false information or conduct themselves in a reticent manner; 3. That the accused illegally or illegitimately influences judges of the Supreme Court, judges of the Plurinational Constitutional Court, regular judges of collegial courts, technical judges, citizen judges, prosecutors, and/or officers and employees of the system of administration of justice. 4. That the accused induces others to perform the actions described in sections 1, 2, and 3 of this Article. 5. Any other circumstance duly accredited that allows one to sustain. 218. The Commission notes, in relation to the pre-trail detention order issued October 17, 2000 by the Ninth Criminal Examining Judge in the Street Lamps case, that this order was issued when Ms. Andrade Salmón was deprived of liberty as a result of the Gader proceeding, thus it did not have a direct effect on her liberty, since she was not enjoying her liberty at that time. Nonetheless, the Commission observes, as per the facts proven, that this order was based solely on Article 233(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and did not take into account the requirements established at Article 233(2), specifically, “…that from the sworn statement one could note the existence of sufficient indicia to lead one to presume her participation in the incident that was being investigated.” 219. The Inter-American Court has established that to restrict the right to personal liberty using measures such as pre-trial detention there must be sufficient indicia to make it possible to reasonably assume that the person facing trial has participated in the unlawful conduct being investigated.271 For the InterAmerican Court, the suspicion must be based on specific facts, and articulated with words, i.e. not on mere conjecture or abstract intuitions. Hence one deduces that the State should not detain so as to later investigate; to the contrary, it is only authorized to deprive a person of liberty once it has sufficient knowledge to have indicia of participation in the unlawful conduct. Nonetheless, even when this rule is satisfied, the deprivation of liberty of the accused cannot be based on general-preventive or specific-preventive purposes attributable to the penalty; rather, it can only be based on a legitimate aim, to wit, ensuring that the accused not limit the development of the procedure or elude the action of justice. 220. The Commission, for its part, has indicated: The assumption to decide the deprivation of liberty of a person within the framework of a proceeding entails serious proof elements that relate the defendant to the investigated fact. This is an necessary requirement at the time of imposing any precautionary measure, since that circumstance, the proof that relates the person to the fact, determines that the defendant is innocent and differentiates him from any other defendant who has not been imposed any coercion measure and who is also innocent.272 221. The Commission has noted in its case-law that once this relationship is established between the facts investigated and the accused, which is required to issue any coercive measure, one must establish the grounds for which one may order the deprivation of liberty during a criminal proceeding. The Convention provides, as the only legitimate grounds for pre-trial detention, the danger that the accused will attempt to 271 I/A Court H.R. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 101; Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, para. 90. 272 IACHR, Report No. 86/09, Case of 12,553 Jorge, José and Dante Peirano Basso v. Eastern Republic of Uruguay, August 6, 2009, para. 77.