The State then discussed the substance of the case, pointing out that there was no evidence that agents of the State had committed any action or omission when proceedings were initiated to impeach Mr. Aguinaga Aillón, and therefore the State was not responsible for violating Article 9 of the Convention. The State also held that there had been no violation of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón’s rights under Article 23 of the Convention regarding his participation in the conduct of public affairs or his participation in elections. It noted, specifically that Mr. Aguinaga could still have been appointed to a position as a public official at any level of responsibility or could have participated freely in electoral processes in Ecuador. A.2. Arguments on the right to appeal the decision and the right to judicial protection 52. The Commission said that Mr. Aguinaga Aillón had no mechanism available for challenging the decision on his dismissal, for two basic reasons. First, given that the dismissal procedure had not been established by law, there were no remedies available to challenge it. Second, the State had issued an order to block the possibility of lodging a remedy of amparo against the congressional resolution. The only available remedy would have been a motion of amparo for constitutional relief, to be adjudged by the new Constitutional Court appointed as a consequence of the same congressional resolution, 25-060, but this automatically nullified any possibility of obtaining an impartial, effective decision, because such a case would have challenged the constitutionality of the very action by which the court itself had been appointed. The Commission found, therefore, that the State had violated Articles 8(2)(h) and 25(1) of the American Convention, read in conjunction with the obligations set forth in Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. 53. The representatives said that a remedy of amparo offered no effective protection because two resolutions had blocked the possibility of lodging such a remedy. The first was Supreme Court Order 01-027, of June 27, 2001, limiting the scope of constitutional motions and stipulating that they were out of order and should be denied outright if lodged against acts of government. The second was a decision by the Constitutional Court finding that the only remedy available for suspending the effects of Congressional Resolution 25-160 (dismissal of the members) was a constitutional motion. The representatives argued that this order made the remedy itself ineffective, because the members of the Constitutional Court had also been dismissed. This eliminated all impartiality and made it materially impossible to lodge such a remedy. They held, therefore, that Mr. Aguinaga Aillón had no access to an effective judicial remedy to protect his rights, which in turn was a violation of Convention Article 25. 54. The State admitted its international responsibility for violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. B. Considerations of the Court 55. The State acknowledged its international responsibility for having violated Articles 8 and 25 by dismissing Mr. Aguinaga Aillón from his position as a member of the TSE, and because no mechanism existed to appeal the decision by which this dismissal had been effected (supra para. 14). It held, nonetheless, that the TSE was an administrative body by nature, not a judicial institution, and that the claims by the Commission and the representatives that the dismissal was a violation of judicial independence did not apply to the instant case. The Court, for this reason and in view of the broad implications of the State's argument for the analysis of the case, will begin its discussion of the merits by 17