fair, objective, impartial proceedings, under the Constitution or laws.57 This is
mandatory, because the fact that judges may be removed from office at will arouses
objective concerns about whether they are able to perform their duties without fear of
reprisal.58
65. All this is based on the important role played by the judiciary in a democracy59 as
the guarantor of human rights,60 which is why judges must be independent, especially
from other branches of government, and this independence must be explicit and
safeguarded;61 otherwise, their work could be so hindered as to render them unable to
adjudge, declare and ultimately sanction the arbitrary nature of acts that could entail
57
Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, para. 155; Case of
López Lone et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 192, and Case of Ríos Avalos et al. v. Paraguay, supra, para. 88.
58
Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 44,
and Case of Ríos Avalos et al. v. Paraguay, supra, para. 88.
Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, para. 154, and Case
of Ríos Avalos et al. v. Paraguay, supra, para. 89. The United Nations General Assembly has declared, in this
regard, that “the independence of the judicial system, together with its impartiality and integrity, is an essential
prerequisite for upholding the rule of law.” United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/1, September
24, 2012. The then-United Nations Commission on Human Rights stated in 2002 that the “essential elements of
democracy” included respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the independence of the
judiciary. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, “Further measures to promote and consolidate
democracy,” Resolution of the 58th session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/46, April 23, 2002, para. 1. The
Human Rights Council has also held that the independence of the judicial system “is an essential prerequisite
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for upholding the rule of law and democracy.”
Human Rights Council, “Integrity of the judicial system,” A/HRC/37/L.11/Rev.1, and “Independence and
impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors, and the independence of lawyers,” A/HRC/44/L.7, July 10,
2020. The European Court of Human Rights has held, similarly, that “judicial independence [is] one of the
most important values underpinning the effective functioning of democracies.” ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov v.
Ukraine - 21722/11. Judgment of January 9, 2013, para. 199.
59
60
Then-United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy,
stated, “[i]n any democratic society, judges are the guardians of rights and fundamental freedoms. Judges
and courts undertake the judicial protection of human rights, ensure the right of appeal, combat impunity and
ensure the right to reparation.” Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, Doc. E/CN.4/2004/60, December 31, 2003, para. 30.
61
Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra, para. 145, and Case of Ríos Avalos et al. v. Paraguay,
supra, para. 89. The European Court of Human Rights has stated, “[t]he mission of the judiciary in a democratic
state is to guarantee the very existence of the rule of law.” ECtHR, Harabin v. Slovakia, no. 58688/11,
Judgment of November 20, 2012, para. 133. It has held that the courts of law in a democratic society must
be free of any political pressure. Its settled case law has consistently ruled that judicial independence
necessarily requires assured irremovability of judicial authorities, who must have “guarantees to shield them
from outside pressures,” and this, in turn, requires consideration of the means by which they are appointed
and the length of their mandate. Cf. Inter alia, ECtHR, Ringeisen v. Austria, no. 2614/65, 16 July 1971, para.
95; Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyêre v. Belgium [GS], no. 6878/75, 23 June 1981, para. 55; X v. United
Kingdom, no. 7215/75, 5 November 1981, para. 53; Piersack v. Belgium, no. 8692/79, 1 October 1982, para.
27; Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, no. 7819/77, 28 June 1984, paras. 78 and 80; Langborger v. Sweden
[GS], no. 11179/84, 22 June 1989, para. 32; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, no.
13427/87, 9 December 1994, para. 49; Bryan v. United Kingdom, no. 19178/91, 22 November 1995, para.
37; Findlay v. United Kingdom, no. 22107/93, 25 February 1997, para. 73; Papageorgiou v. Greece, no.
97/1996/716/913, 22 October 1997, para. 37; Incal v. Turkey [GS], no. 41/1997/826/1031, 9 June 9, 1998,
para. 65; Galstyan v. Armenia, no. 26986/03, 15 November 2007, para. 62; Guja v. Moldavia [GS], no.
14277/04, 12 February 2008, para. 86; Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland, no. 23614/08, 30
November 2010, para. 45; Khrykin v. Russia, no. 33186/08, 19 April 2011, para. 30; Fruni v. Slovakia, no.
8014/07, 21 June 2011, para. 145; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722/11, 9 January 2013, para. 103;
Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GS], no. 2312/08 and 34179/08, 18 July 2013, para. 49;
Baka v. Hungary [GS], no. 20261/12, 23 June 2016, para. 108; Denisov v. Ukraine [GS], no. 76639/11, 25
September 2018, para. 60; Gudmundur Andri Ástrádsson v. Iceland [GS], no. 26374/18, 1 December 2020,
para. 232, and Xhonxhaj v. Albania, no. 15227/19, February 9, para. 298.
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