violations of those rights, or to order relevant redress.62 66. The Court has also found that the guarantee of judicial independence “includes a guarantee against external pressures, and therefore the State must refrain from undue interference with the Judicial Branch or its members” and take action to prevent such interference from being committed by persons or entities outside the judiciary. Likewise, the Court has held that “the United Nations Basic Principles [on the Independence of the Judiciary] provides that the Judiciary ‘shall decide matters before them [...] without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.’” Moreover, “the Principles establish that ‘[t]here shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process.’”63 67. Dating back to Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, this Court has held that the obligation to guarantee, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Convention implies the duty of States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.64 As part of this duty to guarantee, judicial independence stands out as an essential feature in the organization of the government apparatus, without which the State is unable to ensure the free and full enjoyment of rights.65 A corollary to this precept is that judicial independence is indispensable for the protection and effective guarantee of human rights.66 68. It is unquestionable that absent judicial independence, there can be no rule of law, nor can democracy exist (Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter67), because judges must have appropriate and sufficient guarantees to perform their duties of resolving the conflicts that arise in society, in keeping with the legal framework. The lack 62 The Court has held that judicial independence “is not a ‘privilege’ for judges or an end in itself, but has a clear rationale for enabling judges to discharge their duties effectively.” Cf. Case of Villaseñor Velarde et al. v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 5, 2019. Series C No. 374, para. 130. 63 64 166. Cf. Case of Villaseñor Velarde et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 84. Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, said, “as the enforcement of human rights ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice, an independent, competent and impartial justice system is paramount if it is to uphold the rule of law.” Cf. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Doc. A/HRC/26/32, April 28, 2014, para. 3 See also, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the independence of lawyers, Param Cumaraswamy, Doc. E/CN.4/1995/39, February 6, 1995, para. 100, and y General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Doc. A/69/2/94, August 11, 2014, para. 28. Moreover, the Consultative Council of European Judges has stated, “[j]udicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial[; j]udges are ‘charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens.’” Cf. Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 1 for the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges (Recommendation No R (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges and the relevance of its standards and any other international standards to current problems in these fields), November 23, 2011, para. 10. 65 Cf. Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 30; Case of Reverón Trujillo v Venezuela, supra, para. 68, and Case of Villaseñor Velarde et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 75. 66 Cf. General Assembly of the OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Resolution AG/RES. 1 (XXVIIIE/0(1), September 11, 2001. 67 22