that they had originally been appointed by an illegal vote, albeit without specifying any regulation or law providing a legal basis for declaring the dismissal. 81. The Court also notes that the question of whether the congressional appointment had been illegal should have been settled through a judicial procedure by lodging a motion of injury in the administrative courts; if Congress held that the act of appointment had been irregular, it should have taken the case before that jurisdiction to determine whether the appointment was unlawful.89 Similarly, the evidence brought before this Court shows that the only avenue for dismissal of TSE members was through impeachment proceedings under the terms of Article 130, numeral 9 of the Constitution. However, “[n]o prosecutorial investigation was underway against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal or any of its members, nor was there an impeachment process […].”90 82. The Court would like, in the third place, to reiterate its discussion about the institutional character and objective dimension of judicial independence given in the cases of The Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador and The Constitutional Court (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador.91 The Court believes that the circumstances of this case are analogous to those of the other two cases, as the removal of the TSE members occurred as part of a mass dismissal of judges, particularly from the high courts in Ecuador at the time of the facts, which struck a blow not only against judicial independence, but also against the democratic order. 83. The Court must revisit the context in which the facts of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón's dismissal occurred, as this is useful for understanding the reasons or grounds that led to the decision. It is particularly important in the legal analysis of a case to bear in mind the reasons or explanation for a given act by governmental authorities, because any intended purpose other than those provided in the law or regulation that empowers such authorities could point to the conclusion that an action can be considered arbitrary. 84. The Court would recall the facts summarized in chapter VI of this judgment, that at the time the judges were dismissed, Ecuador was going through a period of political instability that had seen the removal of several presidents and multiple amendments of the Constitution as a way to resolve the political crisis. Furthermore, the administration in power at the time was allied with the political party headed by former President Bucaram, which suggests the possible reasons or purpose for wanting to remove the justices of the Supreme Court and the members of the Constitutional Court, that is, the interest in putting a stop to criminal proceedings being conducted by the Supreme Court against former President Bucaram.92 85. Furthermore, the Court recalls that within a period of 14 days, not only were the members of the TSE dismissed, but so were the justices on the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal, which constitutes an abrupt, totally unacceptable course of action. All these facts undermined judicial independence. The Court can thus conclude, 89 Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, para. 175. Cf. Written version of the expert witness statement by Ruth Hidalgo, delivered at public hearing on September 8, 2022, during the 151st regular session (evidence file, folios 2733 and 2734). 90 91 Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, paras. 170 to 179, and Case of the Constitutional Court (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, paras. 207 to 227. Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, para. 174, and Case of the Constitutional Court (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, para. 211. 92 27