merely refers to the justiciability of certain trade union rights and the right to education, whereas it is Article 26 of the American Convention itself that accords this possibility, as we shall see below. 7. Evidently, this position requires further scrutiny of the interpretation of the interAmerican normative as a whole and, particularly, of Article 26 of the Pact of San José, which establishes “the full effectiveness” of economic, social and cultural rights, without the elements of “progressiveness” and of “available resources” to which this article refers constituting conditioning normative elements for the justiciability of the said rights; rather, in any case, they constitute aspects relating to their implementation in keeping with the specific circumstances of each State. Indeed, as indicated in the case of Acevedo Buendía, cases may arise in which judicial control is focused on alleged regressive measures or on inadequate management of the available resources (in other words, judicial control in relation to progressive development). 8. Furthermore, this line of argument requires a progressive vision and interpretation, in keeping with the times, which requires considering the progress made in comparative law – especially that of the highest national jurisdictions of the States Parties, and even the tendencies in other parts of the world – as well as an interpretation that analyzes the interAmerican corpus juris as a whole, especially the relationship between the American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador. 9. This is why, under Article 66(2) of the American Convention, 26 and based on the elements deliberated on and discussed with my esteemed colleagues, I feel the need to add to the Judgment my concurring individual opinion on some of the important implications that this matter has in direct and autonomous relationship to the right to health in cases of medical malpractice. This was the central issue of the facts of the case, which, ultimately, focused on the merits of the matter to declare the international responsibility of the State concerned with regard to other civil rights recognized in the Pact of San José. 10. The intention of this separate opinion is to encourage further thought on the necessary evolution that, in my opinion, should take place in inter-American case law towards the full normative effectiveness of Article 26 of the Pact of San José, thereby granting transparency and real protection to economic, social and cultural rights, which requires accepting their direct justiciability and, if appropriate — as in the case of civil and political rights — eventually being able to declare the autonomous violation of those rights, in relation to the general obligations established in Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention when the circumstances of a specific case require this. 11. Indeed, without denying the progress achieved indirectly in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights and in connection with other civil and political rights — which has been the well-known practice of this Inter-American Court – in my opinion, this approach does not accord full efficacy and effectiveness to those rights, denaturing their essence. Moreover, it does not contribute to clarifying the State’s obligations in this regard and, ultimately, results in an overlap among rights, which leads to unnecessary confusion in these times when there is a clear tendency towards the recognition and normative efficacy through participation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, to application of the system of individual petitions governed by Article 44 through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights.” 26 Article 66(2) of the American Convention establishes: “If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate opinion attached to the judgment. Also, see Articles 24(3) of the Statute of the Inter-American Court and 32(1)(a), 65(2) and 67(4) of its Rules of Procedure. 5