32 113. Additionally, the State indicated that the provisional judges enter the Judicial Power without having approved the Public Competitive Tender, reason for which their conditions and ability to exercise the position have not be proven with the guarantees of transparency imposed by the tenders; instead they are appointed after a revision of their credentials. Secondly, it argued that “[t]he credibility and legitimacy of the justice system requires the guarantee of the ethical, moral, and professional suitability of the judges, which may only be reached through means of objective and impartial mechanisms of selection of the best, as well as through social controls for their appointment.” Finally, it concluded that “[g]uaranteeing an alleged stability for the provisional judges, is contrary to the right of the entire population to have judges appointed through public competitive tenders.” 114. In this sense, the Court points out that provisional judges in Venezuela exercise exactly the same duties as titular judges specifically administrate justice. 148 Thus, the parties have the right, derived from the Venezuelan Constitution itself and the American Convention, to have judges who upon solving their controversies are and appear to be independent. For this, the State shall offer the guarantees that derive from the principle of judicial independence, of both titular and provisional judges. 115. Now, even though the guarantees the titular and provisional judges are the same (supra para. 70) these do not imply the same protection for both types of judges, since the provisional judges are by definition elected differently and they do not have an unlimited continuance in the position. For example, the procedure chosen by Venezuela for the appointment of judges has been through public competitive tenders (supra para. 66). This should supposedly guarantee that the titular judges are upright and fit people, as demanded by international principles. Provisional judges are, by definition, people who have not entered the Judicial Power through these tenders and therefore will not necessarily have the same qualifications as the titular judges. As observed by the State, their conditions and ability to exercise the positions have not been proven with the guarantees of transparency imposed by the tenders. The State may be correct when it points this out. However, the aforementioned does not mean that provisional judges shall not have any procedure for their appointment, since according to the Basic Principles “[a]ny method used for the selection of judicial personnel will guarantee it is not appointed for the wrong reasons.” 116. In the same way in which the State is compelled to guarantee an adequate procedure for the appointment of provisional judges, it shall guarantee them certain tenure in their position. This Court has stated that the provisional nature “shall be subject to a dissolving condition, such as compliance of a predetermined term or the celebration and conclusion of a Public Competitive Tender and background for the appointment of the replacement of the provisional judge with a permanent nature.” 149 This way, the guarantee of tenure is translated, within the realm of provisional judges, in the demand that they be able to enjoy all the benefits characteristic of continuance until the dissolving condition that puts a legal end to their term of office occurs. In this sense, it is important to mention that the former Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela did acknowledge that provisional judges enjoy 148 In this regard, the witness Cabrera Romero, proposed by the State indicated “there is no difference because the provisional judge is actually occupying the position of a full judge for all the cases before it.” Cf. statement offered by Cabrera Romero, supra note 128. 149 Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (First Court of Administrative Disputes) v. Venezuela, supra note 58, para. 43.