DISSENTING OPINION OF THE JUDGE AD HOC EINER ELIAS BIEL MORALES IN THE CASE OF REVERÓN TRUJILLO V. VENEZUELA 1. In the judgment issued in the present case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court” or “the Tribunal”) dismissed the preliminary objection filed by the State regarding lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies. I differ from the majority’s decision and, therefore, with due respect for the opinion of my colleagues, I allow myself to present the legal reasons for my dissent. This difference with the majority prevents me from backing the Judgment in its totality. However, I point out that, in the event that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and issue a decision on the merits of the case is accepted, in general terms, I accept the arguments offered upon deciding the merits of the matter, taking into account that the Inter-American Court upon issuing its decision offers justice to that stated by the victim. The preliminary remedies objection of non-exhaustion of domestic 2. The Preamble of the American Convention states that: “the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American states” (highlight is not from the original). From the aforementioned it can be clearly concluded that the protection offered by the Inter-American System is exclusively complementary to the domestic systems and in no way is it substitutive or the main system. In this sense, it is important to point out that under the terms of the Convention the States Parties undertake to “respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms.” 1 Therefore, the responsibility and obligation to comply with the duties contracted through the Convention falls upon national authorities, which reaffirms the Court’s essentially supplementary nature. This means that only in those cases in which a State has been allowed to repair by itself a violation according to the Convention, and it has not done so, may the Inter-American System have jurisdiction to hear those violations. 3. This undeniable supplementary nature of the Inter-American System is materialized mainly in the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. Specifically, from the start of its duties the Inter-American Court has established that: “[t]he rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies allows the State to resolve the problem under its internal law before being confronted with an international proceeding. This is particularly true in the international jurisdiction of human rights, because the latter “reinforces or complements” the domestic jurisdiction (American Convention, Preamble).”2 1 2 Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights. I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61; I/A Court H.R., Case of Godínez Cruz v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5, para. 64, and I/A Court H.R., Case of Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 85.