categorized as lawful – may be considered incompatible with respect for the fundamental human rights because, among other matters, it is unreasonable, unpredictable or disproportionate.”192 119. It is also relevant to consider the guarantee of judicial control established in Article 7(5) of the Convention, which must occur “promptly” in order to constitute an effective safeguard against unlawful or arbitrary detentions.193 The same provision also establishes that any person detained “is entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released,” even if the proceedings continue. The meaning of this rule is that deprivation of liberty during criminal proceedings is in keeping with the Convention provided it has a precautionary purpose; in other words, that it is used to neutralize procedural risks; in particular, non-appearance at trial.194 120. In addition to the foregoing, Article 7(6) of the Convention protects the right of everyone deprived of liberty to question the lawfulness of their detention before a competent judge or court for the latter to take a prompt decision on the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty and, if appropriate, order their release.195 The Court has clarified that the remedies available to comply with this guarantee “should not only exist formally by law, but must be effective; that is, they must comply with the objective of obtaining a prompt decision on the lawfulness of the arrest or detention.”196 121. Based on the above, and on more specific standards that will be outlined below, this Court will examine the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties and the Commission concerning personal liberty. Accordingly, it will analyze: (1) the lawfulness of the raids and of the arrests made during those raids; (2) the arbitrary nature of the raids and of the arrests made during those raids; (3) the lack of judicial control of the detention of some of the alleged victims, and (4) the absence of an effective remedy, in order to, finally, reach (5) conclusions. B.1.1. The lawfulness of the raids and of the arrests made during those raids (Art. 7(2) of the Convention) 122. Article 9(1) of the Constitution in force at the time of the events established that: “[n]o one may be arrested, detained or imprisoned, except in the cases and according to the procedures established by law, and execution of such actions shall require the corresponding order issued by a competent authority, and notified in writing.” According to article 10, the only exceptions to this general principle were consent and flagrante delicto. Likewise, article 21 established that: “[e]very home is an inviolable refuge; by night, it may not be entered without the consent of its inhabitant and, by day, it may only be entered with a written, reasoned order from a competent authority, except in cases of flagrante delicto.” Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, supra, para. 47, and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 97. 192 193 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Iñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 81, and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 100. 194 Cf. Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 15, 2019. Series C No. 391, para. 100, and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 100. 195 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27.2, 25.1 and 7.6 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 33, and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 101. Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No.129, para. 97, and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 101. 196 38