ownership of the property.236 Thus, the Court considers that confiscated property cannot be disposed of, and can only and exclusively be conserved and managed.237 160. In this specific case, even though the jewelry did not form part of the assets related to the robbery of the Prosegur truck and despite the requests made by Norma Lupe Alarcón de Valencia, there is no evidence that the jewelry was the object of a confiscation order or that it was returned after the trial. In fact, in official communication RQ/LPZ/00818/2004/AP of October 11, 2004, the Ombudsman requested a written report with information on the processing of Norma Alarcón’s requests for its return.238 There is no record in the case file, and it has not been proved by the State, that this request was answered. 161. In conclusion, the Court finds that the State violated the right to property established in Article 21(1) and 21(2) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of Norma Lupe Alarcón de Valencia. VIII-2 RIGHTS TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND OF WOMEN TO LIVE WITHOUT VIOLENCE239 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 162. The Commission considered that it had been sufficiently proved that, during the raids on the houses, heavily armed state agents used a high level of physical and mental violence, violating the personal integrity of all those present. It emphasized that the State had not argued or proved that the force used at the time of the raids was reasonable or necessary. 163. Regarding the allegations of torture, it argued that it had also been proved that 16 people240 were taken to the PTJ facilities where they were interrogated with great violence and without effective legal assistance. They were then detained in unsanitary conditions, without being able to receive visits by either their families or lawyers, while continuing to be physically assaulted and beaten. Following their transfer to different prisons, eight of them241 were kept in solitary confinement for more than 60 days. Therefore, it considered that they were all victims of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment at the hands of state agents. It underlined that all those facts met the criteria of severity, intentionality, and perpetration with a specific object and purpose and, therefore, qualified as acts of torture. Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 187; Case of Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 22, 2015. Series C No. 293, para. 345, and Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of December 1, 2016. Series C No. 330, para. 128. 236 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, paras. 187 and 188, and Case of Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 345. 237 238 Cf. Request No. RG/LPZ/00818/2004 AP issued on October 11, 2004, by the Ombudsman and addressed to the La Paz district prosecutor a.i. (evidence file, folios 1936 and 1937). 239 Articles 5 and 11 of the American Convention and 7 of the Convention of Belem do Pará. According to the Commission, they were Blas Valencia Campos, Norma Lupe Alarcón de Valencia, Claudia Valencia Alarcón, Elacio Peña Córdova, Víctor Manuel Boggiano Bruzzón, Genaro Ahuacho Luna, Alfredo Bazán y Rosas, Mercedes Valencia Chuquimia, Oswaldo Lulleman Antezana, Raúl Oswaldo Lulleman Gutiérrez, Victoria Gutiérrez de Lulleman, F.E.P.M., Carlos Eladio Cruz Añez, Carlos Enrique Castro Ramírez, Freddy Cáceres Castro and Patricia Catalina Gallardo Ardúz. 240 Namely: Blas Valencia Campos, Oswaldo Lulleman Antezana, Carlos Eladio Cruz Añez, Carlos Enrique Castro Ramírez, Elacio Peña Córdova, Víctor Manuel Boggiano Bruzzón, Genaro Ahuacho Luna and Alfredo Bazán y Rosas. 241 48