23 of accused individuals, whether by private counsel or by those appointed by the State as public defenders, is in principle prohibited, with the only exception being that it is allowed when there is no apparent incompatibility. 87. This Court believes that it is the State’s responsibility, through the appropriate authorities, to determine whether such incompatibilities exist and to adopt measures to guarantee the coaccused individuals’ right to defense. This principle is particularly important in cases in which the accused can face a severe sentence, such as the death penalty. In addition, the existence of inconsistencies in the statements made by the co-accused during a criminal trial does not necessarily mean their defenses and interests are incompatible in ways that would preclude joint defense. 88. In this case, however, the contradictions between the statements of the co-accused concern substantive elements of the version of the facts put forward by Mr. Martínez Coronado, such that the contradiction deprived him of a substantive element of his defense. In fact, the judgment in the trial court mentions the fact that Mr. Martínez Coronado states that his co-accused informed him at one in the morning that he had heard shots fired, which is why he went to the location of the crime, while DA denied those facts and stated that he found out about the homicides at six in the morning. The inconsistencies between the statements of the co-accused should have been noted by the joint counsel, who should have made the court aware of them for the purpose of naming another public defender; alternatively, even the legal authorities charged with directing the trial should have taken, on their own initiative, the steps necessary for guaranteeing the right to defense, as this was a public defense provided by the State. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the State failed to fulfill its duty to guarantee the inalienable right to be assisted by a public defender who would ensure the accused would receive an adequate defense, in violation of Articles 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) of the American Convention, insofar as the joint defense violated the rights of Mr. Martínez Coronado. 89. This Court holds, therefore, that given the failure of the State to provide the minimum guarantees necessary for an adequate defense, the State is responsible for violating Articles 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) of the American Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention, to the detriment of Manuel Martínez Coronado. VIII REPARATIONS (Application of Article 63(1) of the American Convention) 90. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 63(1) of the American Convention, 85 the Court has held that every violation of an international obligation which results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation, and that this provision reflects a customary norm that constitutes one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law on State responsibility. 86 91. Remedying the harm produced by the infringement of an international obligation requires, whenever possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which consists in restoring the prior Article 63(1) of the American Convention establishes that: “[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.” 86 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, para. 25, and Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of March 6, 2019. Series C No. 375, para. 220. 85