responsibility for all acts or deeds of individuals,531 because their obligations to adopt prevention and protection measures for individuals in their relationships with each other are conditioned by: (i) whether a State was aware of a situation of danger; (ii) if such danger was real and immediate; and (iii) if the State adopted measures that could reasonably be expected to prevent or avoid that danger.532 284. Regarding the analysis of attribution of international responsibility to the State in the instant case, the Commission observes that a significant number of the acts described were committed by individuals whose identity has not been proven in such a way as to determine whether or not they were state agents. These are fundamentally the acts related to threats, harassment, and surveillance in different places. Nevertheless, the IACHR also observes that some of the acts described came directly from the State, primarily the intelligence activities and statements made by senior officials. The Commission deems that even though these acts originated with the State, they warrant a separate analysis that will be made further on in this report; they are also relevant in this section on analysis of attribution of responsibility for threats, harassment, and surveillance by persons whose ties to the State are impossible to establish. This, to the degree that they might have been involved in the commission of these acts, or by instigating or at least tolerating them. In this regard, the Commission contends that the duties to respect and guarantee [rights] are interrelated in the instant case, as will be analyzed. 285. The Court has deemed that certain rights protected under the American Convention have been violated, for example, in situations in which there has been no state response to threats, harassment, surveillance, and searches committed by non-state actors that were brought to the authorities’ attention.533 Specifically, when human rights defenders have reported to the authorities the threats they have received, this should be enough for the State to activate protection mechanisms to the benefit of the defender at risk.534 286. The Commission thus underscores the fundamental link between an effective investigation and the duty to protect in these types of cases. An effective investigation was one of the main mechanisms the Colombian State had at its disposal to identify sources of risk, understand the facts in context and as part of a possible pattern of common sources of risk related to CAJAR’s work, and, by imposing the respective punishment, to send a message of zero tolerance for acts against CAJAR’s members. In addition, a diligent investigation would have made it possible to institute protection mechanisms for the alleged victims that were suitably designed and implemented to effectively mitigate the specific sources of risk. 287. Because of the foregoing, the Commission has underscored the fact that in order to meet this obligation, States must investigate and punish the persons responsible for harassment, threats, and attacks against human rights defenders.535 The investigation must be done immediately and must be thorough, serious, and impartial in order to identify the source of the threats and punish those responsible, with the aim of trying to prevent the threats from being carried out.536 In terms of the obligation to punish those responsible, the Convention requires that not only the direct perpetrators of human rights violations be punished, but also the masterminds.537 As will be analyzed further on, this is especially relevant in cases of human rights defenders in which determining who the mastermind is is directly tied to the examination of whether the facts reported constitute retaliation for the work they do. I/A Court H.R. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre. Paragraph 117. several of its judgments, the Inter-American Court has considered European Court case law with respect to the elements comprising the duty to protect. In this regard, see: I/A Court H.R. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, paragraph 124; I/A Court H.R. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No.205, paragraph 284; I/A Court H.R. Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, paragraph 124. 533 I/A Court H.R. Case of Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 12, 2005. Series C No. 132, paragraphs 56‐57. 534 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, December 31, 2011, paragraph 43. 535 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, December 31, 2011, paragraph 45. 536 In considerations related hereto, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated, for example, that “as an essential part of its duty to protect, the State must take effective measures to investigate and, where appropriate, punish those responsible for the acts that gave rise to the adoption of the provisional measures.” I/A Court H.R. Giraldo Cardona Case with respect to Colombia. Provisional Measures. Order of June 19, 1998, operative point 4. 537 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, December 31, 2011, paragraph 45. 531 532In 54