established in the American Convention; consequently, the obligation not to investigate and prosecute human rights violations in the military criminal jurisdiction is a guarantee of due process that must be respected by the States Parties from the time they ratify this treaty. 686 445. The Court also points out that, at least since the judgment in the case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, it has been the Court’s consistent case law that the military jurisdiction is not the competent jurisdiction to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute and punish the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations; rather the prosecution of those responsible corresponds always to ordinary justice. 687 The facts of the case of Durand and Ugarte relate to events that occurred in 1986; 688 thus, this Court considers that this consideration is also applicable to the instant case in which the events occurred in November 1985 and were referred to the military criminal jurisdiction in 1986, where the investigations were continued until 1994. However, the Court repeats that, regardless of the year in which the violations occurred, the guarantee of an ordinary judge must be analyzed in relation to the object and purpose of the American Convention, which is the effective protection of the human being. 689 446. Furthermore, the Court takes note of the assertion by expert witness Federico Andreu Guzmán 690 that, already in 1987, the Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia had disallowed “the prosecution by military courts of soldiers or police agents implicated in forced disappearances, because forced disappearance cannot be considered a service-related act.” Even though it would not be until 1997 that the Constitutional Court “established unequivocally the limits of the military jurisdiction with regard to human rights, and the notion of service-related act,” 691 the Court observes that, since 1987, the need for human rights violations to be investigated and prosecuted by ordinary criminal justice had been noted in the domestic sphere. Nevertheless, the investigation into the forced disappearance of Irma Franco Pineda and the torture of Yolanda Santodomingo Albericci and Eduardo Matson Ospino continued in the military criminal jurisdiction until 1993 and 1994, respectively, when it was considered that the criminal action for torture had prescribed, and that there were no grounds to prosecute the forced disappearance (supra paras. 166 and 168). In addition, at the same time as the events of the case and during their investigation by the military criminal jurisdiction, other international bodies for the protection of human rights, such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights, as well as political organs of international organizations, such as the General Assembly of the United Nations, had ruled that human 686 Cf. Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 248, para. 241. 687 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68, paras. 117, 118, 125 and 126, and Case of Osorio Rivera and family members v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2013. Series C No. 274, para. 189. 688 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68, para. 59. 689 Cf. Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 248, para. 244, and Case of Osorio Rivera and family members v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2013. Series C No. 274, para. 189. 690 The State contested the considerations of Federico Andreu Guzmán arguing that they were “based on decisions that do not coincide with the temporal limits of the events that are being litigated.” In this regard, the Court reiterates its previous consideration that the guarantee of an ordinary, independent and impartial judge is derived from the American Convention and does not depend on the rulings or decisions of this Court when interpreting the Convention, or those of other human rights bodies. 691 Cf. Written summary of the expert opinion of Federico Andreu Guzmán (evidence file, folios 36375 to 36378). 156