did not seek for the […] Court to apply the norms of [international humanitarian law, which] is partially satisfactory.” It added that, “insofar as [the facts relating to the supposed excessive use of force] are excluded from the judgment, it can be understood that the State withdraws this preliminary objection.” 38 The Commission indicated that, on several occasions, the Court had referred to the principles of international humanitarian law “merely in order to guide the decision on whether the State concerned incurred in a violation of the American Convention,” and this is what it is called on to do in the instant case. For their part, the representatives clarified that “[e]ach and every one of the alleged violations […] refers to rights protected by the [Convention] and other inter-American treaties ratified by Colombia,” and underlined that this objection “ignores all the Court’s previous case law concerning its competence with regard to violations of [international humanitarian law],” without indicating why the Court should diverge from this case law. A.2) Considerations of the Court 39. In the instant case, neither the Commission nor the representatives have asked the Court to declare the State responsible for possible violations of norms of international humanitarian law. In accordance with Article 29(b) of the American Convention and the general rules for the interpretation of treaties contained in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the American Convention can be interpreted in relation to other international instruments. 39 Starting with the case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia, the Court has indicated that the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions may be taken into account as elements for interpreting the American Convention. 40 Therefore, when examining the compatibility with the Convention of a State’s actions or norms, the Court may interpret the obligations and the rights contained in this instrument in light of other treaties. In this case, by using international humanitarian law as a norm of interpretation that complements the Convention, the Court is not ranking the different laws, because the applicability and relevance of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict is not in doubt. It merely means that the Court may observe the rules of international humanitarian law as a specific law in the matter, in order to apply the norms of the Convention more precisely when defining the scope of the State’s obligations. 41 Hence, if necessary, the Court may refer to provisions of international humanitarian law when interpreting the obligations contained in the American Convention in relation to the facts of this case. 42 Consequently, the Court rejects this preliminary objection. 38 The arguments concerning the facts that allegedly fall outside the factual framework will be examined in the chapter on preliminary considerations of this Judgment. 39 Cf. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2001. Series C No. 79, para. 148, and Case of Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 30, 2014. Series C No. 276, paras. 77 and 78. In this regard, Article 31.3.c of this Vienna Convention establishes as a general rule of interpretation that: “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context: […] (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” 40 Cf. Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia. Preliminary objections. Judgment of February 4, 2000. Series C No. 67, paras. 32 to 34. See also, Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 209; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 115, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of November 30, 2012. Series C No. 259, para. 23. 41 Cf. Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of November 30, 2012. Series C No. 259, para. 24. 42 In this regard, the Court’s ruling in the case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia is applicable: “when determining the international responsibility of the State in this case, the Court cannot disregard the existence of the State’s general and special obligations to protect the civilian population arising from international humanitarian law, in particular Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and the norms of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts 18