10 26. The legal concept of a continuous or permanent offense thus entails behaviors whose consummation extends over time as a single, continuous violation, 18 and the Court has used this concept primarily for cases of forced disappearance. 19 In the instant case, however, both the Commission and the representatives requested that the standard of on-going violation be applied to the incarceration and the proceedings pursued in the military courts in view of the fact that, while they began before Argentina had ratified the Convention and accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, these situations persisted even after acceptance (supra par. 20 and 21). 27. In this regard, the Court recalls similar cases of alleged violation of a right involving detention or long-lasting domestic processes, in which the Court has restricted its scope of temporal jurisdiction to facts that occurred after the date of recognition of the jurisdiction by the particular State.20 The same standard has been applied by the European Court of Human Rights.21 28. This Court therefore stands by its jurisprudence constante on the subject and admits the preliminary objection lodged by the State. Accordingly, it declares that it has no jurisdiction to hear facts and arguments associated with: 1) the 1980 arrest warrants against the applicants; (2) the adoption and duration of pretrial detention from September 9, 1980 through September 5, 1984; (3) the duration of procedures from 1980 through September, 1984; (3) the 1980 order for solitary confinement as a precautionary measure; (4) the “exhortation to tell the truth” in formal opening statements taken from September 1980 through September 1984, and (5) the lack of defense counsel until September 5, 1984. This Court also declares that it is competent to hear all the actions or events that occurred after September 5, 1984 regarding violations alleged by the Commission and the representatives. B. Lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae B.1 Arguments by the State, the Commission and the representatives 29. The State said that the representatives had asked the Court to hold the State liable for alleged violation of several articles of the American Declaration, but had not asked for a judgment on violation of article 29(d) of the American Convention. This, according to the State, must necessarily lead to dismissal of any claim to examine alleged responsibility based on the American Declaration. Therefore, because the Court’s material jurisdiction in the exercise of its contentious role is limited to the provisions of the American Convention, the State asked the Court to declare itself not competent to judge on breaches of the provisions of the American Declaration, as the representatives would wish. 18 Cfr. Case of Alfonso Martín del Campo Dodd v. Mexico, footnote 13, Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, par. 40. 19 Among others, cfr. Case of Blake v. Guatemala par. 39 and 40, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 4, 2012. Series C No. 250, par. 37. 20 Cfr. Case of Cantos v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 7, 2001. Series C No. 85, par. 39; Case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 11, 2005. Series C No. 123, par. 111, and Case of Grande v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections and Merits. Judgment of August 31, 2011. Series C No. 231, par. 39 and 40 21 Cfr. ECHR, Humen v. Poland (26614/95), Judgment of October 15, 1999, par. 58-59; Kudla v. Poland, Grand Chamber (30210/96), Judgment of October 26, 2000, par. 102, 103 and 123, and Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, Grand Chamber (48787/99), Judgment of July 8, 2004, par. 395-399.