54 209. The Court, viewing the evidence adduced in the case file, notes first of all that the application of common criminal laws was expressly allowed under article 510 of the Code of Military Justice (supra par. 203). That is, the special laws (the military code) pointed to the substantive general laws (provisions from Book I of the Criminal Code) to supplement its own in cases of military crimes. The Court therefore holds that the specific application of the provisions from Book I of the Criminal Code – including article 67 and the institution of “consequences of the trial” – was legal and predictable, as stated by the Supreme Court. An examination of the relevant law shows that the application of the general criminal provisions had been established prior to the military criminal laws. 210. It is thus clear that there was no “change” in the procedural rules or violation of the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws in the decision by the Supreme Court to reject the request to apply the statute of limitations to the criminal action. 211. Still unanswered is the argument by the representatives that the application of the military criminal law led to more severe punishment for their clients. It is necessary in this matter to clarify that the decision by the Supreme Court did not limit the court that would eventually judge the appeal on the merits (National Chamber of Criminal Cassation) in terms of setting the sentence, nor did it order the use of the military criminal rules in preference to the general criminal rules. To the contrary, the sentencing decision was made, as this Court has recommended in the past, in strict adherence to the provisions of the law, rigorously matching the criminal conduct to the codified crime. The evidence in the case file shows that the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation performed this task by handing down final sentences for the defendants, such that the decision on the statute of limitations did not entail a harsher penalty, as the representatives have claimed, and therefore, this argument should be dismissed. 212. The Court would also discuss the claim that Mr. Candurra received no reply to his petition for the statute of limitations during the article 445 bis hearing (that is, following the Supreme Court decision). In the first place, it is clear that when the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation judged the matter, it adhered to the earlier decision by the Supreme Court, because the claim was based on the same facts and arguments that had already been weighed. Nevertheless, the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation, in the discussion of its decision on the appeal, also addressed the argument for invoking the statute of limitations in the following terms: The reintroduction of [the petition] before this Chamber to invoke the statute of limitations […] is based on the same grounds that the Supreme Court already considered when it resolved the matter; therefore, because the circumstances examined by the High Court at that time have not changed, it is mandatory to uphold its view and not to admit the declaration of the statute of limitations as requested. […] [Regarding the] petition lodged […] by Mr. Mastroestéfano and Mr. Cueto based essentially on the view that since the early stages of the proceedings there have been undue delays that undercut the guarantees set forth in the American Convention […], recently incorporate[d] into the Constitution[,] it is evident that the amount of time the process took in the military jurisdiction cannot compare to the “unusual and extended” period cited by the Supreme Court as the basis for its judgment in the “Mozzatti” case being cited [in which the Court declared null and void the actions conducted and invoked the criminal statute of limitations].200. 200 Grounds for the March 20, 1995 judgment by the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation, April 3, 1995 (evidence file, folios 2299 to 2301).