covers the right of access to justice lato sensu; in other words, the right to full jurisdictional benefits. In the words of the Court: “(...) Access to justice is a peremptory norm of international law and, as such, gives rise to obligations erga omnes for the States to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that such violations do not remain unpunished, either by exercising their jurisdiction to apply their domestic law and international law to prosecute and, when applicable, punish those responsible, or by collaborating with other States that do so or attempt to do so” (para. 131). 5. I had argued precisely in the same sense in my extensive separate opinion (paras. 63-65)4 in the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia (judgment of January 31, 2006), in which I also covered other aspects: (a) Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention at the ontological and hermeneutic levels (paras. 14-15); (b) the genesis of the right to an effective domestic recourse in the corpus juris of international human rights law (paras. 16-21); (c) the right to an effective recourse in the case law of the Inter-American Court (paras. 24-27); (d) the indivisibility of access to justice (the right to an effective recourse) and the guarantees of due process of law (Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention)(paras. 28-34); (e) the indivisibility of Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention in the consistent case law of the InterAmerican Court (paras. 35-43); (f) the indivisibility of Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention as an inviolable advance in case law (paras. 44-52); (g) overcoming the difficulties concerning the right to an effective recourse in the case law of the European Court (paras. 53-59); and (h) the right of access to justice lato sensu (paras. 60-61). 6. In this judgment in the Dismissed Congressional Employees case, the Court has once again confirmed its consistent case law by considering Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention in an indivisible and interrelated manner, in combination with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention.5 Nevertheless, I consider that the solution found by the Court’6 to the issue raised in this case does not do justice to the concepts it has adopted correctly on the right of access to justice (supra). 7. Regarding the unsatisfactory paragraph 136 of this judgment, which is similar to the unsatisfactory wording of Article 26 of the American Convention (a product of its time), owing to absolute lack of time, in view of the accelerated work “methodology” adopted recently by the Court, over my objection, I will merely reiterate my understanding, expressed in numerous publications over the years, that all human rights, even economic, social and cultural rights, are promptly and immediately demandable and justiciable, once the interrelation and indivisibility of all human rights are affirmed at both the doctrinal and the operational levels – in other 4 . In this separate opinion, I observed that “[t]he indivisibility between Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention […] leads me to characterize access to justice, understood as the full realization of justice, as forming part of the sphere of jus cogens; in other words, that the inviolability of all the judicial rights established in Articles 25 and 8 considered together belongs to the sphere of jus cogens. […] the fundamental guarantees, common to international human rights law and international humanitarian law have a universal vocation because they are applicable in any circumstance, constitute a peremptory right (belonging to jus cogens), and entail obligations erga omnes of protection” (para. 64, and cf. paras. 6062). 5 . Paragraph 119 and the second operative paragraph. 6 . Fourth operative paragraph.