VIII-2 RIGHTS TO WORK AND TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 120 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 103. On the basis of the Court’s case law in “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Acevedo Buendía et al. (Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller) v. Peru, Muelle Flores v. Peru and National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence (ANCEJUB-SUNAT) v. Peru, the Commission noted that, in this case, the workers: (i) pursued judicial remedies to claim their labor entitlements and benefits; (ii) had a judicial judgment favorable to their claim; (iii) for long years the patrimonial effects of that judgment were not determined, giving rise to uncertainty and legal insecurity, and (iv) to date said decision has yet to be fully executed. In conclusion, the Commission considered that the State is responsible for violating the right to private property guaranteed in Article 21(1) and 21(2) of the Convention, read in conjunction with the obligations established in Article 1(1) thereof. 104. In its final written observations, the Commission underscored that its Report on the Merits was adopted before the Court’s case law evolved on the justiciability of Article 26 of the Convention. It indicated that the Court had already made a specific application of work rights under that article within the scope of the immediate obligations in two cases against Peru (Muelle Flores and ANCEJUBSUNAT), which are juridically similar to this case. Therefore, the Commission asked that the Court declare the State responsible for violating Article 26 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1). 105. In her final written arguments, the representative Meneses Huayra claimed that the alleged victims should receive all the work benefits to which they entitled for having worked and contributed to the State for years and that, nonetheless, the harm occurred when the CCTM “erroneously made the liquidation of the additional pay increase, under Article 5 of Law 25,177, which meant a loss in their income and patrimony,” obliging them to make use of the courts to have their rights restored, which involved “years of fighting in the courts,” and “causing uncertainty and legal insecurity revictimizing them by impeding the enjoyment of their patrimonial rights, especially in the case of some victims whose right to a pension has been affected.” It, therefore, concluded that the State is also responsible for violating the right to property. 106. The State specified that, when a person has a certain “acquired” right, that right should be recognized, respected and guaranteed by the public authorities. However, in this case the payment of fringe benefits and other calculations that FEMAPOR claimed should be included in the stage of execution were not rights recognized in the decision, especially if the State, at the time, had already complied by paying the social benefits and the fringe benefits, thus complying with a judicial mandate. It also alleged the following: i. That the judicial decisions on amparo did not recognize the payment of fringe benefits for the maritime and port workers; ii. That the liquidation of a new amount for entitlements and social benefits, educational allowance and interest that 2,317 [sic] former workers have been claiming since the execution of the decision of February 12, exceed the terms of the judicial decisions and there is no judicial decision with the force of res judicata that recognizes such payment; therefore, the rights being claimed have not been incorporated into their patrimony, and 120 Articles 26 and 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 28