judicial protection. Although, in referring to Article 26, the Court stated that the right to receive a fair and previously agreed upon salary was affected, that harm was due to the failure to observe the obligation to guarantee that the competent authorities comply with judicial decisions; in this case, those that order the payment of the workers’ remuneration. Thus, it is clear that the scope of protection was the same as that under Article 25(2)(c) of the Convention and that the mention of the right to work was unnecessary due to the declaration of State responsibility or the redress for the victims, which was the principal object of the proceedings before the Inter-American Court. Dealing with the issue solely as one of the right to judicial protection or a related issue would have been sufficient to achieve a broad degree of protection for the victims in this case without incurring in the logical and juridical inconsistencies of the direct justiciability of the ESCER. To have done so, the decision would have been unanimous and a reiterated jurisprudential position that weakens the legitimacy of the Court would have been avoided. Humberto A. Sierra Porto Judge Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Registrar 3